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I. ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY
In the early morning of August 21, 2013, one of the deadliest chemical
weapon attacks seen in modern times was launched against urban
neighborhoods in the Damascus area. Resulting in numerous civilian
casualties, the attack has since been categorically condemned by the
international community as constituting war crimes and crimes against
humanity. This paper contemplates a hypothetical prosecution of its
alleged mastermind, President Bashar al-Assad of the Syrian Arab
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Republic, under the auspices of the International Criminal Court. After an
examination of the publically available evidence, the court's jurisdictional
authority is surveyed and observed to extend over al-Assad. This is
followed by exploring possible charges by the prosecution, to see which
ones are viable enough to survive to conviction. The most viable of them,
would likely be: (1) the crime against humanity of extermination; (2) the
war crime of attacking civilians; and (3) the war crime of employing
prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices. Liability is very likely to
attach for each of these offenses, either because al-Assad directly ordered
the attacks, or through the doctrine of superior responsibility.
II. INTRODUCTION
Sometime between December 28 and December 29, 2016, a ceasefire
was declared between the major hostile parties in the Syrian Arab
Republic.' Russia's promises to scale back its military presence could
provide enough trust between the combatants and lead toward an eventual
peaceful resolution to the volatile conflict.2  However, with a lasting
ceasefire comes the question of whether to allow President al-Assad's
regime to continue. As part of answering such a question, the
international community will face the dilemma of whether a peaceful and
stable world order requires prosecution of individuals, including President
al-Assad, for the many international crimes that took place over the course
of the conflict. Among the most notable and well-documented of these is
the chemical weapon attacks at Ghouta.
On August 21, 2013, the early morning silence was suddenly pierced by
the sound of screaming rockets in the Ghouta region south and east of
central Damascus.3  The first attack struck Ein Tarma, followed minutes
later by rocket detonations in Zamalka, both districts within miles of
central Damascus (Eastern Ghouta).' A subsequent rocket attack struck
1. Angela Dewan, Syria Civil War New Nationwide Ceasefire Undenvay, CNN (Dec. 29,
2016, 9:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/29/middleeast/syria-ceasefire-talks-turkey-russia/
[https://perma.cc/LXN5-H72N].
2. Id.
3. Syria Chemical Attack: Wbat We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399 [https://perma.cc/MX2Y-P6S8]
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Moadamiyah (Western Ghouta), a small town west of Zamalka, several
hours later.s The death toll total ranged from 300 to 1,300 people.6 What
was most horrifying about these attacks was that the rockets employed
were determined to be carrying chemical payloads of the nerve agent, Sarin
gas.' Due to prior allegations of the use of chemical weapons, a U.N.
team of experts' (U.N. Mission) was already present in the war-torn
country by invitation of the Syrian government.' Having arrived only days
prior, the U.N. Mission was initially tasked with conducting on-site
5. Id
6. Id. The main opposition alliance claimed the death toll was 1,300; Medecins Sans
Frontieres recorded 355 deaths out of 3,600 patients affected; the Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights confirmed conservatively 502 deaths; the Violations Documentations Center in Syria listed
and mostly named 588 deaths, including 108 children and 135 women; and the United States
government determined preliminarily that 1,429 (including 426 children) had died as a direct result of
the attacks. Id.
7. U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chem. Weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic, Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area
of Damascus on 21 August 2013, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553, at 8 (Sept. 16, 2013)
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9
%7D/s_2013_553.pdf [https://perma.cc/TML5-4NUQ] [hereinafter U.N. Mission Report -
Ghouta].
8. The U.N. team of experts was comprised of members of the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Id at 4.
9. Id. at 4-6. The Syrian government alleged that the March 19 chemical weapon attack on
Khan al-Assal was conducted by "armed terrorist groups" via a rocket launched five kilometers away.
U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chem. Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Final Report, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2013) https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/12/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG4F-FT6W] [hereinafter U.N. Mission - Final Report].
Upon impact, the rocket released a cloud of smoke that rendered persons exposed unconscious. Id.
at 3. The smoke was reported to have caused 25 deaths and injury to more than 100 individuals. Id
As the site of the attack was in the immediate vicinity of a Syrian military position, a number of the
dead and injured were soldiers of the Syrian government. Id. at 2-3. On March 19, following the
attack, the Syrian government formally reported the incident to the U.N. and blamed foreign-backed
rebel forces. Id. The very next day, the Syrian government requested the U.N. Secretary-General to
establish and send an independent U.N. mission to investigate. Id at 3. Over the next few months,
however, numerous nations including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, submitted
letters to the Secretary-General reporting other chemical weapon attacks by the Syrian government
both before and after the Khan al-Assal incident, including the incident at Ghouta. Id. Investigating
seven of the sixteen allegations, the U.N. Mission conclusively found chemical weapons-particularly
Sarin-were repeatedly used in the conflict, and in at least one case, by "clear and convincing
evidence" and were used indiscriminately on a large scale in the Ghouta incident. Id. at 10-21.
Other incidents, although yielding ample evidence of the use of Sarin gas, did not satisfy the fact-
finding evidentiary standard of the U.N. Mission. Id.
168 [Vol. 49:165
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inspections for prior allegations of chemical weapons use.10 Upon request
by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, however, the team was quickly
diverted to the Ghouta region to begin on-site inspections on August 25,
2013.11 In a subsequent visit, the U.N. Mission also investigated other
alleged uses of chemical weapon incidents including Khan al-Assal
(March 19, 2013); Saraqueb (April 29, 2013); Sheikh Maqsood (April 13,
2013); Bahhariyeh (August 22, 2013); Jobah (August 24, 2013) and
Ashrafiah Sahnaya (August 25, 2013).12 Although nearly all of the
investigated instances yielded "credible information" that chemical
weapons (Sarin) had been used, the Ghouta investigation found "clear and
convincing evidence that chemical weapons were also used against
civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale."'3
On September 14, 2013, although they were already signatories to the
1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(Geneva Protocol),1 4 the Syrian Arab Republic, motivated by a horrified
international reaction and threat of imminent foreign military
10. Id. at 2-8.; see Ambassador Bashar ja'afari, Identical Letters dated 19 Mar. 2013 from the
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/172, at 1-2 (Mar. 19, 2013)
(reporting to the U.N. that rebel "terrorists" backed by foreign countries were responsible for a
chemical weapon attack in Khan al-Assal on March 19, 2013).
11. U.N. Mission - Final Report, supra note 9, at 7-8. In order to conduct their investigation,
the U.N. Mission had to negotiate a ceasefire with both the Syrian government and rebel factions that
took place at certain hours of the day for the areas they inspected or visited. Id. at 8. The inspection
team was faced with continuing threats of harm including one instance of sniper attack throughout
their investigation. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7 at 6.
12. U.N. Mission - Final Report, supra note 9, at 10-18.
13. Id. at 19.
14. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 66-94 [hereinafter
Geneva Protocol]; see also Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: Status of the Treaty, U.N. Office for
Disarmament Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/1925 [https://perma.cc/8YYN-TA53]
(showing Syria's accession to the Geneva Protocol on December 17, 1968). French intelligence also
reported the Syrian government exhibited a "clear willingness to destroy any evidence aposteior' by
causing intentional delay to the U.N. Mission. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE - MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND INT'L. DEV., SYIuA/SYRIAN CHEM. PROGRAMME - NAT'L EXEC. SUMMARY OF
DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Syrian.
Chemical_Programme.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5AP-KXD3] [hereinafter FRANCE DIPLOMATIE].
2017] 169
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intervention,'5 acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).1 6 On
December 2, 2013, however, Navi Pillay, then U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, declared the U.N. had evidence of war crimes and
crimes against humanity authorized at the "highest level," including
President Bashar al-Assad."
This paper intends to explore a possible prosecutorial case against
Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. Part III will focus on the evidence thus
far publically available from the Ghouta attacks for the purpose of
prosecuting President al-Assad for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Part IV will explore what methods and options the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has in interpreting its law and how
precedent may be utilized to overcome first impression problems faced by
the Court. Part V will analyze the possible charges the ICC might utilize.
Part VI will look at their viability in light of the question of double
jeopardy. Part VII will examine how President al-Assad might be liable
under the doctrine of superior responsibility if direct liability cannot be
established. Lastly, Part VIII will be comprised of concluding statements.
15. The United States' threat of military intervention in response to Syrian use of chemical
weapons was averted at the last minute by a Russian diplomatic effort persuading al-Assad to agree to
surrender all Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles for destruction. Patrice Taddonio, "The President
Blinked": Why Obama Changed Course on the 'Red Line" in Syria, PBS FRONTLINE (May 25, 2015),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinked-why-obama-changed-course-on-
the-red-line-in-syria/ [https://perma.cc/54R9-XE5D].
16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Dev., Prod., Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3, 6, 317 [hereinafter Chemical
Weapons Convention]; see also ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEM. WEAPONS, STATUS OF
PARTICIPATION IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AS OF 14 OCTOBER 2013, at 6
(Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S-series/2013/en/s-1131-2013_e_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TKG6-JK55] (listing Syria as acceding to the Convention by depositing an
instrument of ratification with the Depositary on September 14, 2013).
17. UN Implcates Bashar al-Assad in Syria War Crimes, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25189834 [https://perma.cc/P6XX-BSFZ]. ("The
UN's commission of inquiry into Syria has produced 'massive evidence ... [of] very serious crimes,
war crimes, crimes against humanity,' Ms. Pillay said.'D; see also Rep. of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65, at 1
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf//7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ahrc25_65.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7CR-X4CH] [hereinafter U.N. Indep.
Int'l Comm'n Rep.] (detailing numerous repeated violations of international law including the use of
prohibited chemical weapons, war conduct disregarding international conventions regarding non-
combatants, indiscriminate targeting during military operations, and unlawful killings).
170 [Vol. 49:165
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III. THE EVIDENCE FROM GHOUTA
The U.N. Mission visited the individual sites of the Ghouta attacks,
Moadamiyah, Ein Tarma, and Zamalka, within a week of the fateful
incident.'" As part of their on-site investigations, the U.N. Mission
interviewed both survivors and witnesses, examined the remains of the
munitions used during the attack, collected environmental samples,
examined survivors for symptoms, and took samples of hair, blood, and
urine for subsequent analysis." During their investigation, the team of
experts adhered to "stringent protocols" and operating procedures in
gathering evidence and testimony "to withstand future scrutiny."20 These
protocols were pursuant to established WHO and OPCW standards and
were also in accordance with U.N. Guidelines.2 1
A. Weather at the Time of the Inddent
In its report, the U.N. Mission noted the choice of optimal weather
conditions on August 21 for the chemical attack.2 Between 2:00 AM and
5:00 AM, air temperature was falling, causing air to move downward
toward the ground.2 ' Atmospheric conditions, therefore, preserved any
chemical gases-especially heavier chemical gases-by keeping them
closer to the ground instead of allowing them to dissipate into the
atmosphere.2 4  Furthermore, since this effected a more two-dimensional
dispersion of chemical gas (rather than a three-dimensional dispersion), the
gas had an increased area of effect and penetration of building interiors.2 5
18. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4; see U.N. Secretary-General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, U.N.
Doc. A/44/561, at 11-12 (Oct. 4, 1989) (adopting and detailing the U.N. Guidelines and Procedures
for the Timely and Efficient Investigation of Reports of the Possible Use of Chemical and
Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons); see also U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7,
at 11-12 (listing the standard operating procedures and guidelines for evidence collection,
documentation, chain of custody, packing of off-site samples, laboratory preparation and analysis,
managing inspection laptops, and the handling of confidentiality).






Cho: Chemical Weapon Attacks in Ghouta
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
172 ST. MARY'S LAwJOURNAL [Vol. 49:165
This maximized the potential exposure of people seeking shelter in the
"lower levels of buildings" from bombs and artillery fire.2 6
B. Evidence Regarding the Munitions Used
1. Rockets Used at Western Ghouta
At several impact sites, the U.N. Mission also examined the remains of
several surface-to-surface rockets suspected of being responsible for the
atrocity.27  At Moadamiyah, one of the rocket motors was found intact
after surviving initial impact with a second story wall, somehow becoming
separated from the warhead." The component, painted in light gray, was
marked with numbers in black on its exterior: "97-179.",21 On the
engine's bottom ring, the following was also engraved: "r H LU 4 25 - 6 7 -
179 K." 3 o The engine itself had ten jet nozzles positioned in a concentric
pattern with an "electrical contact plate in the middle."" Based on U.N.
evidence, the Human Rights Watch determined the munition to be a
140mm M-14 rocket of Soviet design.3 2  According to a declassified U.S.
munitions catalogue, there were only three types of warheads produced for
M-14 rockets." One of them is for Sarin gas.3 4  Moreover, the Human
26. Id. According to the Human Rights Watch, the timing of the attack for the Moadamiyah
area was "shortly after the completion of the Muslim morning prayer." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
ATTACKS ON GHOUTA: ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA, AT 4
(Sept. 2013) [hereinafter HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA].
27. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 7, 21-26.




32. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 5.
33. Id. at 5 (citing U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Intelligence Agency,
Ammunition Data and Terminal Effects Guide - Euraian Communist Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92
(Mar. 5 1992) ("[P]artially declassified and released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.").
The other possible warheads for an M-14 Rocket are the M-14-OF high explosive-fragmentation
warhead, and the M-14-D smoke-containing-white-phosphorus warhead. Id. The use of white
phosphorus can be considered a chemical weapon if the substance is intended to be used to "cause
harm or death through the toxic properties of the chemical." Paul Reynolds, White Phosphorus:
Weapon on the Edge, BBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2005, 11:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4442988.stm [https://perma.cc/ZSN4-HDMA] (quoting Peter Kaiser, spokesman for the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). However, it can still be used to produce
camouflage smoke without violating the Chemical Weapons Convention. Id.
34. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 5. The electric contact plate in the
rocket motor found at Moadaniyah is a "unique identification characteristic" of the M-14 Rocket.
Id. Furthermore, the 179 markings on both the ring and the exterior indicate it was produced in
8
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Rights Watch also noted the M-14 rocket was present in the Syrian arsenal
in large part due to numerous conveyances from the Soviet Union to Syria
during 1967-1969."
2. Rockets Used at Eastern Ghouta
At Zamalka and Ein Tarma, the U.N. Mission identified remnants of
rockets common to both sites.3 6 Furthermore, the rocket design used for
both Zamalka and Ein Tarma were "consistent with that of an unguided
rocket."3 7  Although some of the remains were "deformed on impact,"
the U.N. investigators were able to determine that the designs were
capable of a maximum liquid payload capacity of approximately fifty-six
liters.3 ' The engine itself had six stabilizer fins with a circular, stabilizing
metal ring around them.3 ' The Human Rights Watch analysis of the U.N.
data concluded the rockets used in the Eastern Ghouta region were
330mm surface-to-surface rockets.40 The analysis highlighted the rockets'
330mm diameter because they could only be launched from uniquely
Iranian-made rocket launchers." In terms of the 330mm rockets' origin,
however, the analysis concluded that, unlike the M-14 rockets, the rockets
used at Zamalka and Ein Tarma were most likely of Syrian origin and
industrially produced.4 2 The Human Rights Watch concluded the
Novosibirsk at "Factory 179"-"one of the largest producers of artillery and rockets during the
Soviet period, and a known manufacturer of the 140mm M-14 rocket," Id. The Human Rights
Watch estimates that this type of rocket is capable of carrying 2.2 liters of liquid. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 22.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 22, 24. The Human Rights Watch separately determined that the chemical payload
of the rockets used in Eastern Ghouta would range from 50-60 liters compared to the 2.2.-liter
payload of the Moadamiyah rockets. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 9.
39. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 23.
40. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 7-9.
41. Id. at 9-12. The Iranian-made rocket launcher, the Falaq-2, is unique to Iran as it is "the
only country in the world to produce rocket launchers in the 333mm category." Id at 9. Numerous
instances of Syrian governmental forces utilizing the Falaq-2 to launch 330mm rockets have been
well-documented in Internet videos. Id.
42. Id. at 12. The 330mm rocket has not been observed prior to the beginning of the Syrian
conflict. Id at 9. However, based on video documentation since the conflict began, it is believed the
330mm rocket was designed for relatively short ranges and not for accuracy. Id. at 12. Informally
referred to as "Volcano" rockets, the 330mm rocket design is similar to the Iranian Falaq series
design in that it trades its maximum potential range (and accuracy) in exchange for a larger (and more
9
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Zamalka and Ein Tarma rockets were specifically designed for delivering
chemical weapons in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.4
3. Probable Trajectories of Both Sets of Rockets
Probable trajectories were also calculated based on two impact sites: one
in Moadamiyah and one in Ein Tarma.' The U.N. Mission determined
the original azimuth" of the 140mm M-14 rockets to be approximately
215 degrees.4 ' The U.N. Mission Discovered the 330mm rockets found at
Zamalka and Ein Tarma had an azimuth of 105 degrees.47 By analysis, the
Human Rights Watch established that the 140mm M-14 rocket has a
destructive) payload. N.R. JENZEN-JONES ET AL., ARMAMENT RES. SERVS. PTY. LTD., IRANIAN
FALAQ-1 AND FALAQ-2 ROCKETS IN SYRIA, ARES, at 11 (May 2014), http://www.
armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ARES-Research-Report-No.2-Iranian-Falaq-
1-Falaq-2-Rockets-in-Syria.pdf [https://perma.cc/8274-G3KN]. For comparison purposes,
however, the Falaq-2 rocket, with a similar diameter, has a maximum range of up to 10.8 km. Id.
at 18.
43. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 12. The 330mm rocket has been
observed in the Syrian conflict to exist in two variants. Id. The first variant contains a high-explosive
warhead and is 400mm longer than the rockets found at Zamalka and Ein Tarma. Id. On the other
hand, the Zamalka and Ein Tarma rockets (the chemical weapons variant) has an additional plug used
to insert chemical agent into the warhead payload compartment. Id. As this variant is "industrially
produced," it is evident they were specifically designed for use as a chemical weapon as opposed to
being jury-rigged in the field. Id. The non-aerodynamic form of the rocket is also consistent with its
chemical weapon function, as non-aerodynamic forms are not designed for accuracy. Id
Additionally, based on prior alleged chemical weapon attacks compared to conventional artillery
attack videos, the chemical weapons variant is marked with identification numbers in red, whereas
the high-explosive variant is numbered in black lettering. Id. All of the rockets found at Zamalka
and Ein Tarma were numbered in red and had shorter warheads, indicating they were all of the
chemical weapons variety. Id. Finally, evidence strongly suggests that none of the opposition forces
or sub-groups possess the 330mm rocket or the Faluqa-2 launcher system as part of their arsenal. Id.
44. The U.N. mission's report explained its analysis of the rockets' trajectory:
Of the five impact sites investigated by the Mission, three do not present physical characteristics
allowing a successful study of the trajectories followed by the rockets involved, due to the
configuration of the impact places. However, Impact site number 1 (Moadamiyah) and Impact
site number 4 (Ein Tarma) provide sufficient evidence to determine, with a sufficient degree of
accuracy, the likely trajectory of the projectiles.
U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, spra note 7, at 25.
45. Azimuth is calculated as the number of angular degrees in a clockwise rotation from due
north. A zmuth, AM. HERITAGE C. DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2002).
46. Impact site number 2, only 65 meters away, likewise had an azimuth of 214 degrees. U.N.
Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 26. The variance of a single degree between the two sites
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minimum range of 3.8 kilometers and a maximum of 9.8 kilometers."'
Assuming the 330mm rocket's range is not substantially different,"9 the
respective azimuths combined with effective ranges intersect at the Syrian
government-controlled military base for the 104th Brigade of the
Republican Guard.so
4. The Presence of Sarin Gas
As stated above, the U.N. Mission concluded "clear and convincing
evidence" shows the use of Sarin gas in the Ghouta attacks.s" Samples
from rockets' parts found at all three sites were taken and subsequently
analyzed at OPCW-designed laboratories." A majority of them tested
positive for the presence Sarin or its by-products." The U.N. Mission
also obtained and analyzed thirty environmental samples from all three
sites in the course of their investigation.5 4 These samples ranged from soil
samples, samples of debris, clothing and fabric samples, and wipe
samples.5 5 Subsequent laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of
Sarin in the majority of these samples.5
Out of eighty survivors matching the U.N. Mission's criteria, thirty-six
were selected for diagnosis by the team's medical experts.5 Consistent
48. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 6.
49. For the purposes of trajectory and calculating potential points of origin, it is probably safe
to assume the 330mm rocket, utilizing a similar design philosophy as the Falaq-2, has a maximum
effective range that does not extend beyond 10 kilometers. See JENZEN-JONES, supra note 42, at 11,
15, 18 (comparing the Falaq-2 rocket to the "Volcano" rocket in its design philosophy).
50. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at iv-v; see also Syria ChemicalAtack: What
We Know, supra note 3 (showing a map of the region outlining the M-14 rocket's potential launch
points based on effective range, its azimuth, and the 330mm rocket azimuth all converging on the
military base designated for the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard). The Human Rights Watch
analysis of the effective range for the M-14 rocket is based on a declassified U.S. intelligence
reference guide on munitions. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 6 (citing U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, Ammuniion Data and Terminal Effects
Guide - Euraian Communist Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92 (Mar. 5, 1992)) ("[P]artially declassified and
released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.").
51. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 8.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 7, 23.
54. Id. at 7, 27-37.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
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with exposure to Sarin gas, 78% experienced loss of consciousness, 61%
experienced shortness of breath, 42% had blurred vision, 22% had
irritation or inflammation of the eyes, 22% salivated excessively, 22%
experienced vomiting, and 19% reported convulsions or seizures.5 8
Thirty-four of these patients were also selected to provide blood, urine,
and hair samples.5 9  These samples, upon separate laboratory testing,
returned dispositive confirmation that Sarin gas was employed in the
Ghouta attacks."o
Interviews of survivors and treating medical clinicians were also
consistent with the presence of Sarin.6 ' First responders-including nine
nurses and seven physicians-reported seeing "a large number of ill or
deceased persons lying in the streets without external signs of injury."62
"Those who went to assist other community members described seeing a
large number of individuals lying on the ground, many of whom were
deceased or unconscious."6 3  These witnesses consistently reported
symptoms of those frequently associated with Sarin exposure. 6 "Several
of these 'first responders' also became ill . . . ."6 Furthermore, of the
survivors interviewed, 7 0% had lost two family members or more.6 6  In
one tragic instance, two brothers reported being the only survivors from
forty family members all living in the same building.6
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 7,14-18.
60. Id. The samples were tested in separate independent laboratories and produced results
with only minor variances. Id. at 18. When divided between Moadamiiyah and Zamalka, the
Moadamiyah blood samples were 100% positive at Laboratory 4 and 94% positive for Laboratory 3.
Id. 91% of the Zamalka blood samples tested positive for Laboratory 4 and for Laboratory 3, they
were 85% positive. Id. The urine samples had only minor divergences when divided by the attack
sites. Id. 100% of the urine samples tested positive for Sarin from Moadamiyah while only 91%
were positive from Zamalka. Id. Between the high percentages returned from different sites and the
presence of only a slight variance between independent laboratories, there is little to no doubt as to
the presence of Sarin at the scenes of the attacks. Id at 7.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. "Survivors reported a military attack with shelling, followed by the onset of a common
range of symptoms, including shortness of breath, disorientation, rhinorthea (runny nose), eye
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C. Evidence Gathered by Intellgence Agencies
Multiple intelligence agencies arrived at conclusions with "high
confidence" that are consistent with each other regarding the Syrian
government's responsibility for the Ghouta attacks.6" United States
intelligence services, relying on "human, signals, and geospatial intelligence
as well as a significant body of open source reporting," reported
"[m]ultiple streams of intelligence indicate that the regime executed a
rocket and artillery attack" on Ghouta.6" U.S. satellite detections further
corroborated the source of the attacks originated from a "regime-
controlled area."7 o The United States also reported that members of the
Syrian chemical weapons organization7 1 were observed operating in the
area-near a known chemical weapons mixing site-from three days prior
till the morning of the attack.7 2 Furthermore, the U.S. reported observing
"a Syrian regime element prepar[ing] for a chemical weapons attack in the
Damascus area, including through the utilization of gas masks."7 3  With
regard to the Syrian government's motivation for the attack, the United
States assessed the following:
68. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14; CHAIRMAN JON DAY, JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMM., SYRIA: REPORTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE (Aug. 29, 2013) (UK), http://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/attachment-data/file/235094/Jp 115JDPM SyriaReportedChem
icalWeaponUse with_annex.pdf [https://perma.cc/62C8-2ZWZ] [hereinafter JOINT
INTELLIGENCE COMM.]; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Government
Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30,
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-
government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august21 [https://perma.cc/FB35-9Z5Z] [hereinafter Office of
the Press Secretary].
69. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. Id. "The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center-which is subordinate to the
Syrian Ministry of Defense-manages Syria's chemical weapons program." Id According to a
French intelligence assessment:
[The Syrian military responsible for filling munitions with chemical agents and for security at
storage sites-"Branch 450" of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (CERS)-was
staffed only by members of the president's Alawite sect and was "distinguished by a high level
of loyalty to the regime." Bashar al-Assad and certain members of his inner circle were the only
ones permitted to give the order for the use of chemical weapons ....
Syna ChemicalAttack- What We Know, supra note 3.
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The Syrian regime has initiated an effort to rid the Damascus suburbs of
opposition forces using the area as a base to stage attacks against regime
targets in the capital. The regime has failed to clear dozens of Damascus
neighborhoods of opposition elements, including neighborhoods targeted
on August 21, despite employing nearly all of its conventional weapons
systems. We assess that the regime's frustration with its inability to secure
large portions of Damascus may have contributed to its decision to use
chemical weapons on August 21.
Perhaps even more damning evidence involves the interception of
communications by U.S. intelligence concerning the attack and
corresponding subsequent action by the Syrian government forces:
We intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately
familiar with the offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used
by the regime on August 21 and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors
obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of August 21, we have intelligence
that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed to cease operations.
At the same time, the regime intensified the artillery barrage targeting the
neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour period
after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate
approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days. We continued
to see indications of sustained shelling in the neighborhoods up until the
morning of August 26.
A British intelligence services report confirmed the conclusions of the
United States in attributing liability to the Syrian regime with the "highest
possible level of certainty."7 6  "Permission to authori[z]e [chemical
weapons] has probably been delegated by President As[s]ad to senior
regime commanders, such as [*], but any deliberate change in the scale and
nature of use would require his authorization."" Moreover, British
intelligence emphasized that opposition forces were not capable of such an
74. Id.; see JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMM., supra note 68 (concurring the attacks "were
conducted to help clear the Opposition from strategic parts of Damascus").
75. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68.
76. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMM., supra note 68, at 1-2.
77. Id. "[*" denotes redaction of certain senior commanders in the Syrian regime. Id.
Presumably, they have been redacted to protect the confidentiality of sensitive sources of
information and the possibility of potential prosecution of these individuals. Id.
178 [Vol. 49:165
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attack due to its unprecedented scale, tactical coordination, and the lack of
possession of such weapons.7
The U.S. findings were also independently verified by a French
intelligence report utilizing mostly "French-only sources."7 9 Their report,
after detailing the history of the Syrian chemical weapons program,
underlined that the Syrian regime had "one of the most important
operational stockpile [of chemical weapons] in the world, without any
perspective of programmed destruction in the absence of a Syrian
willingness to join the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention]."8 o The
French report estimated that Syria's "particularly massive and diversified"
arsenal contained "[s]everal hundred tons of sulfur mustard, . . . [s]everal
tens of tons of VX,s . . . and [s]everal hundreds of tons of sarin" kept in
binary form." Additionally, the report revealed that Syrian scientists were
working on nitrogen mustard-a chemical agent with a "toxicity level
higher than sarin"-as well as new and more efficient dispersal
mechanisms." The French report also confirmed the Syrian possession
of a number of delivery systems for chemical agents.8
With regard to the attacks themselves, French intelligence concluded
that the attacks were "consistent, on a military level, with the Syrian armed
78. Id. Russia alleged with a "good degree of confidence" that opposition forces were
responsible for the attack. Id. However, British, U.S., and French intelligence reports independently
and emphatically refuted that there was any credible evidence supporting the capability of opposition
forces to pull off the attacks at Ghouta. Id.; FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14; Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 68.
79. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14; Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68. In
addition to other findings, French intelligence independently confirmed the use of sarin gas through
the observation of the final death toll, symptoms, dispersal pattern analysis, and comparisons with
"impact models of chemical attack" extrapolated by specialist experts. Id. French intelligence
discounted the possibility of opposition manipulation of the utilized information. Id.
80. Id.
81. "VX is the most toxic among the known chemical warfare agents .... Id.
82. Id. Satin is stored in the form of two distinct chemicals (binary) and then mixed just prior
to use. Id.
83. Id
84. With "thousands of launchers" available, the Syrian regime's armed forces were reported
to have: Scud C missiles (500 kin), Scud B missiles (300 km), M600 missiles (250-300 km), SS21
missiles (70 kin), air launched bombs, and artillery rockets (50 km or less). Id.; Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 68. In addition to other chemical agents, all of these munitions are capable of
carrying satin. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14.
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forces' doctrine." 5  As part of their "classical tactical pattern," Syrian
forces began an attack on a hostile position with a combined air and
artillery bombardment-allowing for the integration of chemical
weapons-followed by a ground offensive." As observed by French
intelligence, Eastern Ghouta was bombarded by conventional air and
artillery units between 3:00 AM and 4:00 AM." Similarly, chemical
attacks were directed at Zalmalka, Ayn Tarma, and Kafr Batna followed by
a ground offensive commencing at 6:00 AM." Over several days
following the chemical attacks, the French report observed that the Syrian
regime conducted additional ground and air strikes as part of an effort to
delay the U.N. Mission from being able to conduct on-site
investigations. French intelligence concluded this was also done as a
means of destroying evidence."o "Furthermore, the military set off fires,
aiming apparently at purifying the atmosphere thanks to the air movement
generated by the intense heat."9
IV. THE ICC AND How IT CAN PROSECUTE PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD
President al-Assad, among other senior officials of the Syrian Regime,
has since been accused of a long list of crimes under international law,
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.9 2  A potential
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. "Several sources" confirmed that the artillery rockets used by the Syrian regime were
capable of delivering chemical agents. Id. at 5.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68.
91. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14; Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68.
92. U.N. Indep. Int'l Comm'n Rep., supra note 17, at 12. In their report to the General
Assembly of the U.N., the Human Rights Council concluded:
The Syrian Arab Republic has acted in breach of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Right, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol thereto
on the involvement of children in armed conflict....
In the course of the conflict, the warring parties in the Syrian Arab Republic have failed to
comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. They have violated the
fundamental prohibitions of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which are binding
on all parties to the conflict. Such violations amount to war crimes, incurring individual
180 [Vol. 49:165
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prosecution of President al-Assad may prove to be problematic for a
number of reasons, even if international politics is removed from the
equation." First, the list of offenses for which President al-Assad may
incur liability is quite expansive. Government forces, under President al-
Assad's oversight, have reportedly conducted "widespread attack on
civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced
disappearances" under a crime against humanity standpoint."4 Under a
war crimes perspective, he may be liable for "murder, hostage-taking,
torture, rape and sexual violence, using and recruiting children in hostilities
and targeting civilians in sniper attacks."9 Furthermore, government
forces under his purview have also "disregarded the special protection
accorded to hospitals, medical and humanitarian personnel and cultural
property. Aleppo was subjected to a campaign of barrel bombing ... [and]
[g]overnment forces ... perpetrated massacres."' The Syrian military
forces also "used incendiary weapons, causing superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering .... Indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial
criminal responsibility. Individual fighters and their commanders may be held accountable for
their acts under international criminal law and by States exercising universal jurisdiction.
U.N. Indep. Int'l Comm'n Rep., supra note 17, at 23; see also UN Implicates Bashar al-Assad in Syria War
Crimes, supra note 17 (reporting then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay's
official statement that "[t]he UN's commission of inquiry into Syria has produced 'massive
evidence ... [of] very serious crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity[]").
93. See Syria Crisis: Russia and China Step Up Warning Over Strike, BBC NEWS (Aug 27, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canda-23845800 [https://perma.cc/4Q4V-LU7M] (reporting
Russia and China's-both permanent members of the Security Council with veto power-official
criticism and opposition to the reactive desire by "Western powers" to intervene in Syria).
94. U.N. Indep. Int'l Comm'n Rep., supra note 17, at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. Barrel bombs are essentially:
[O]ld oil barrel packed with explosives, shrapnel and maybe some kind of incendiary
device .... They are literally pushed out of the helicopter and when they land-they detonate
on impact-and explode. [They] take down whatever is in their path.... The Syrian Air Force
is either criminally incompetent, doesn't care whether it kills scores of civilians-or deliberately
targets civilian areas.
Matthew Bell, What are 'Barrel Bombs' and Why is the Syrian MiitaU Using Them?, PUB. RADIO INT'L
(Feb. 4, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-02-04/what-are-barrel-bombs-and-why-
syrian-military-using-them [https://perma.cc/473C-TKAY]. Given their indiscriminate and wide
spread area of effect, they are very likely violative of international law concerning conduct during
war, especially in urban areas. See id. ("[A]s a weapon of terror, this thing is extremely effective.").
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bombardment and shelling caused large-scale arbitrary displacement."9 7
Choosing which crimes to charge President al-Assad under may thus be a
difficult decision.9" Moreover, how each crime is charged-either based
on discrete offensive acts or on a campaign of offensive acts-may
present problems as well.9 9
Second, attaching liability for these acts may also be problematic due to
his position as an executive of state.0 0 The attachment of liability
conceivably could set dangerous precedent against other state
executives."0 ' This in turn may undermine the political will-in addition
to charging options-of other world leaders to hold President al-Assad
accountable for a number of the listed alleged offenses.1 0 2
Third, given the relative youth of the ICC,'o3 its unique nature, and
jurisdiction, properly adjudicating criminal charges-especially because it is
likely multiple charges will be filed-against President al-Assad may
generate far more controversy than regular domestic criminal cases.'0 4
Prosecuting the case before the ICC will likely require the court's careful
navigation through-or avoidance of-issues of first impression.0 5
Additionally, since the ICC relies on a Roman civil law system (as opposed
97. U.N. Indep. Int'l Comm'n Rep., supra note 17, at 1.
98. See id. (listing the sheer number of "gross violations of human rights" and "war crimes").
99. See id. ("Government forces have committed ... the war crimes of murder, hostage-taking,
torture, rape and sexual violence, recruiting and using children in hostilities and targeting civilians in
sniper attacks.").
100. See Brett Edwards & Mattia Cacciatori, Why Bashar Al-Assad Won't Face Justice
Over Chemical Weapons Any Time Soon, NEWSWEEK, (Sept 2, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/dont-expect-assad-be-held-justice-495251 [https://perma.cc/3KRG-
XVEWtype=image] (reporting on the difficulty of holding heads of state responsible which now
seems "beyond the reach of the ICC").
101. See id. ("To date, not only have investigations against sitting heads of state been
inconclusive, they also appear to have contributed to domestic crises in the states they have occurred
in.").
102. See id. (referring Libya to the ICC in 2011 caused the collapse of the State and led
President Obama to publicly declare it as "the worst mistake of his presidency"'). Other world
leaders are thus unlikely to put themselves in the same situation with Syria.
103. The International Criminal Court came into existence in 2002 as explained in the next
section. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
104. See Edwards & Cacciatori, supra note 100 ("It has also reignited calls for Syria to be
referred to the FICC]. But, yet again, we have seen Russia, Syria and Iran seeking to prevent or
hamstring any process to prosecute the Assad Regime.").
105. Closed Stage, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/closed.aspx
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to a common law system),1o' seeking jurisprudential guidance may be
problematic in itself. Finally, the risk of judicial odyssey is especially
magnified because the ICC has only a handful of cases under its belt.107
Here, however, for the sake of reducing the risk of prosecutorial
odyssey, this hypothetical prosecution of President al-Assad will focus on
trying him for the illegal use of chemical weapons at Ghouta. In this
hypothetical prosecution, chargeable crimes listed under the Rome
Statute1 os will be examined in conjunction with each other. This paper
will also explore how liability may attach under the doctrine of superior
liability, among others.'09
A. The International Criminal Court
1. Jurisdiction of the ICC
The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ("Rome Statute")"10 and entered into force in 2002.111
The ICC is situated at The Hague and has subject matter jurisdiction under
Article 5 for the crimes of genocide,12 crimes against humanity," 3 war
crimes, and the crime of aggression."' The ICC is independent of the
U.N., although it maintains a cooperative relationship with the U.N.'s
international body." 5
The ICC's jurisdiction over nation-states, however, is somewhat limited
compared to domestic state courts. The Court's jurisdiction first extends
to all parties under the Rome Statute."' "[]he Court may exercise its
106. The International Criminal Court does not rely on stare decisis principles as used by
common law systems. Instead it relies on a Roman-Civil Code system. Rome Statute, supra note 103.
This is further explained in the next section.
107. ICC - Closed Stage, supra note 105.
108. Rome Statute, supra note 103.
109. See Infra Part C.
110. Rome Statute, supra note 103.
111. Id.
112. Id. art. 6.
113. Id art. 7.
114. Id. art. 8.
115. U.N. General Assembly, Relationshrp Agreement Between the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/58/874 (Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
43f203bb4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLZ-XUM3].
116. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 12.
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jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute
or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. . . ."11 A non-party
nation-state may also accept jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis via
voluntary declaration."' The ICC's jurisdiction may be further limited
based on geography and over a person's national identity."' This is
dependent upon whether the territory where the alleged crime occurred
belonged to a party of the Statute.12 0
Once these precursors are met, a case can reach the ICC in several ways.
A State party 2' or the U.N. Security Council122 may refer a case to the
ICC for the prosecution of international crimes.'2 3 Alternatively, the
prosecutor'2 4 may also initiate a case proptio mots.12 5  However, under
Article 17 of the Statute, a case is inadmissible before the ICC when a
State, also having jurisdiction, has conclusively investigated the case or
intends to prosecute the case in its own judicial system.126  Nevertheless,
if such a State is "unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 12(3).
119. Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).
120. Id art. 12(2)(a). Additionally, if the alleged crime occurred on a ship or airplane, "the
State [o]f registration" of the vessel will be determinative for jurisdictional purposes. Id.
121. "The Court may exercise its jurisdiction ... i[n]: (a) A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in
accordance with article 14; . . . ." Id. art. 13(a).
122. "The Court may exercise its jurisdiction . .. i[n]: (b) A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; ..... Id. art. 13(b); see also U.N.
Charter art. 39-51 (enumerating broad powers to the U.N. Security Council for the purposes of
determining the existence of and taking collective action for "threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act[s] of aggression").
123. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 13.
124. See id. art. 42(1) (establishing the Office of the Prosecutor as a "separate organ of the
Court").
125. Id. art. 15(1).
126. Id. art. 17(1). There are some specific circumstances where the court may exercise
jurisdiction:
The Court may exercise jurisdiction in a situation where genocide, crimes against humanity or
war crimes were committed on or after 1 July 2002 and: the crimes were committed by a State
Party national, or in the territory of a State Party, or in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court; or the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the United Nations Security
Council pursuant to a resolution adopted under chapter VII of the UN charter.
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investigation or prosecution," the ICC may determine the case to be
admissible before it.1 2 7
2. Establishing the ICC's Jurisdiction over the Syrian Arab Republic
Establishing jurisdiction of the ICC over President Bashar al-Assad, on
first impression, would seem problematic because the Syrian Arab
Republic is technically not a party to the Statute.1 2 8  However, a solution
to this may lie in the fact that, although it has yet to ratify it, the Syrian
Arab Republic was a signatory to the Statute on November 29, 2000.129
Therefore, the ICC may establish its jurisdiction over Syria under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).130
Under the Vienna Convention, Syria is obligated "to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when"-as applied
here-Syria "has signed the treaty ... subject to ratification .. . until it
shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty .. "
127. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 17(l)(a). The ICC's jurisdiction embraces the concept
of "complementaity"-complementing that of the States' in criminal matters. See ICC: How the Court
WF~orks, supra note 126 ("The ICC is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal
systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not[,] are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.").
128. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%2
Ostatute.aspx [https://perma.cc/5YQD-CT3F].
129. Depositary, Status of Treaties, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, 10. Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N.T.C. 1 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%2011/Chapter/s20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VLM-XBSL].
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 1, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
131. Id. art. 18. Syria ratified the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties on October 2,
1970, with certain reservations-none of them which overtly affect the application of Article 18.
Depositary, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXIII, Law of Treaties, 1. Vienna Convention on the law of
Treaties, U.N.T.C. 2, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume/`20II/Chapter%20
XXIII/XXIII-1.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q66M-UDYq. Article 18 states:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
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Several alternate routes may be more easily facilitated' via provisions
of the Rome Statute itself. Under Article 13(b), the U.N. Security Council
has the power to refer alleged criminal acts to the Prosecutor of the
ICC." 3 Another alternate route is possible if the Syrian Arab Republic
itself declared itself subject to the ICC's jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.'3 4
Obviously, this latter situation would only be possible in a future scenario
where President al-Assad has been removed from power and a new
government has been installed in its place.
In any of the scenarios listed above, it should be no challenge for the
potential prosecution of President al-Assad to be admissible as a case
before the Court.1 3 s Under the current regime, it is self-evident that the
Syrian domestic courts (under the al-Assad regime) are "unwilling" to
genuinely prosecute President al-Assad or any of his senior officials.' 3 6
Syrian courts, if a criminal investigation even happens at all, are more than
likely to manipulate the judicial process in order to "shield," cause "undue
Vienna Convention, supra note 131, art. 18.
132. The availability of these alternative routes is based on the assumption that the process
will not be undermined by the veto power that U.N. Security Council members possess. See Jeremy
Blackman, Geting to 'No" Why Russia Loves the Veto, PBS (Sept. 26, 2012, 12:10 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/un-security-council-getting-to-no-why-russia-loves-the-
veto/ [https://perma.cc/TL77-2FMH] ("The Russian-led vetoes are proof of the country's
influence, but have also served to neuter the entire international body and caused some to question
the point of even having a United Nations.").
133. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 13(b).
134. Id art. 12(3). Under Article 11, the ICC's jurisdiction is limited (urisdition ratione tempotis)
to criminal acts conducted after the date a State becomes party to the Statute. Id. art. 11. An
exception exists, however, pursuant to Article 12 where jurisdiction is created retroactive to the date
of the alleged act if the State declares its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis.
Id. art. 11, 12(3).
135. Id art. 17.
136. Under Article 17, the ICC is excepted from the ICC principle of complementarity if the
"State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Id. art. 17(1)(a).
In these situations, the Court may evaluate the admissibility of the case:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider[ ... whether
one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken .. . for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. . .
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
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delay," or otherwise remain far from being impartial.' 1 7  Additionally,
even in the regime change scenario, there is a high probability that the
Syrian judicial system would be unable to adequately prosecute these
individuals due to a substantial collapse during the regime change itself.1 3 8
Therefore, the ICC would be the most appropriate forum to prosecute
President al-Assad under the majority of permutations of either basic
scenario.1 3 9
B. The ICC's Use of Precedent and Legal Princjples
As referenced above, the ICC is organized under a Roman civil law
system of jurisprudence.140 Under such a system, precedent is viewed and
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 17(3). But see Saddam Hussein Trial Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 12, 2016),
http://wwwv.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/saddam-hussein-trial-fast-facts/ [https://perma.
cc/DUM4-K5W5] (detailing the timeline of events in the domestic prosecution of Saddam Hussein
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the wake of being removed from power).
139. See ,Q&A: Syria and the International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 17,
2013, 2:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/qa-syria-and-international-criminal-
court#14 [https://perma.cc/SJ6K-SS66] (exploring the need, methods, and possible implications of
prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria but discussing the possibility
of prosecution by other national criminal courts under the doctrine of "universal jurisdiction'.
140. See Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent ly Internationaljudges and Arbitrators, 2J. INT'L
DisP. SETILEMENT, no. 1, 2011, at 5, 12-14 (2011) ("Turning now to international
jurisdictions ..... The courts have in fact no obligation to comply with precedent ... [w]e see that
all the international jurisdictions distance themselves in principle from the rule of stare decisis.").
Under Article 21 titled "Applicable law" of the Rome Statute:
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules
of international law, including the established principles of the international law of
armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.
Rome Statute, supra note 103 art. 21.
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utilized under jurisprudence constante doctrines.'"' The baseline principle for
Roman civil law systems is the idea that "[tihe role of the courts is to solve
disputes that are brought before them, not to make laws or
regulations."14 Therefore, only statutes or other enacted legislation-in
the case of the ICC, the Rome Statute and other similar conventions-
qualify as primary sources of law.' These laws are formulated-albeit
imperfectly-to be complete, thereby leaving little to no discretion to the
courts.'" However, similar to the common law stare decisis system, the
use of prior case law plays an important role in assuring more "certainty
and completeness in the law."' 4 5 The divergence between the two
141. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Iau Systems: A Dynamic Analysis,
26 INT'L REv. L & ECON. 519, 522 (2006).
142. Id.
143. Id.
A sequential and orderly method (mithode) of interpretation is therefore necessary. As the
history of the law reveals, the existence and application of a uniform method is the best way to
achieve consistency predictability and fairness of outcomes. Thus the following points are
proposed to further achieve this consistency: 1) The Statute controls; 2) the Elements and the
Rules are to serve as guidelines for the Court's interpretation of the Statute but are not binding;
3) where an inconsistency or a gap exists in the Statute, the Elements and the Rules, the Court is
to resort to the sources of international law contained, in a hierarchal order, in Article 38 of the
ICJ's Statute, namely treaties, customary international law, general principles of law, and the
writings of the most distinguished publicists (doctrine); 4) in respect to all other issues, the
sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and as interpreted by the
ICJ, should be applied; and 5) the Court must rely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and its customary law evolution to interpret the treaty's provisions.
I M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL COURT
165 (Transnational Publishers 2005) [hereinafter Bassiouni - LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
144. Fon & Parisi, supra note 142, at 22.
145. Id. Although the ICC relies on the Roman civil law system, it has adopted some
common law attributes as a result of being an international melting pot of numerous national
criminal jurisprudence. Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 407, 434-36
(2001). The Prosecutor of the ICC and the Court itself have broad discretion under the Rome
Statute unlike most other Roman civil law courts. Id. "Many unique facets of international tribunals
stem from attempts to blend the two predominant western juridical traditions, civil law and common
law." Id "[Tlhe ICC is not strictly bound to peremptory rules of procedural law and can adopt
evaluations tending to verify whether the immediate proceedings constitute a violation of the right to
a fair trial." Id.
In other words, the control given to the judge [unlike typical Roman civil law systems] is used
exclusively to ascertain whether the act was done in conformity with the form provided for by
law. If a violation occurred, the civil law system does not provide for the judge to inquire as to
whether actual prejudice resulted.
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systems begins where case law, under the common law system's stare
decisis doctrine, is allowed in some circumstances to have binding
authority.14 6 The Roman civil law system, on the other hand, does not
obligate courts to adhere to prior case law as a per se binding authority.
Instead, under juriprudence constante, a body of case law that meets a
sufficient threshold of uniformity and consistency is, at a maximum,
persuasive, but with "considerable authoritative force."1 4 8
In the case of the ICC, however, there are very few cases tried by the
Court from which to draw case law at all.' Because of its relative youth,
only five cases tried by the ICC have reached closed status.1 so Of these
Id.
146. Fon & Parisi, supra note 142, at 522.
147. Id. at 524 ("Under jurisprdence constante doctrines[,] a judge is not bound by a single
decision in a single previous instance. Authoritative force stems from a consolidated trend of
decisions on a certain point.").
148. The doctrine ofjurisrudene constant explains how courts should treat prior cases:
This path of legal development gave rise to jurisprudence constante, the doctrine under which a
court is required to take past decisions into account only if there is sufficient uniformity in
previous case law. No single decision binds a court and no relevance is given to split case law.
Once uniform case law develops, courts treat precedents as a persuasive source of law, taking
them into account when reaching a decision. The higher the level of uniformity in past
precedents, the greater is the persuasive force of case law.
Id. at 522. However, Roman civil law courts are continuously adherent to the idea that "legislation,
the solemn expression of the legislative will, is the superior source of law." Willis-Knighton Med.
Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1087 (La. 2005). "Jurisprudence
constante carries 'considerable persuasive authority,' but is not the law." Id at 1088.
There are three paths to establishing this persuasive yet authoritative force: dominant positive
jurisprudence, dominant negative jurisprudence, and split case law. Fon & Parisi, supra note 142,
at 525. Dominant positive jurisprudence occurs when a "sufficiently large percentage of cases"
accept or approve a cause of action. Id. Dominant negative jurisprudence, on the other hand, exists
when a "sufficiently large number of cases" negates a claim. Id Split case law, moreover, happens
when the case law has an insufficient consensus of decisions in either direction. Id. In such a
situation, these decisions are awarded little authoritative weight. Id.
Furthermore, when a judgment is made in opposition to dominant jurisprudence, it will usually
be reversed on appeal. Id. It can still, however, be valuable in developing countervailing case law by
beginning or enlarging an existing trend of dissent in the judiciary. Id.
149. ICC - Closed Stage, supra note 105.
150. "Cases may be closed once a conviction/sentence or an acquittal becomes final [usually
after appellate review], although a case involving a conviction/sentence [i.e. not an acquittal] may be
reopened for revision. . . ." Id. As of October 18, 2016, the ICC has ten cases undergoing
preliminary examinations, ten "situations" under investigation, zero cases in the pre-trial phase, five
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five cases, two did not have their charges confirmed, one was withdrawn,
one was vacated, and one was acquitted.1 5 1 However, the ICC, while not
bound by them, may draw from past ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.1 5 2 Of particular relevance to the ICC are the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 5 3  and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).1 5  Formed by the
U.N. under the provisions of Article 41 of the U.N. Charter,"ss both ad
hoc tribunals served as successful temporary models for the more
permanent ICC. 15 6 A comparison of the three tribunals reveals
similarities in the founding instruments, the structure (organs of the
courts), the crimes falling within the courts' jurisdictions, and
procedure."' The ICC, although young in its formation, may thereby rely
on case law developed by the sixty-two convictions (out of ninety-three
indictments) of the ICTR15 and the 154 completed trials (out of 161
indictments) of the ICTY. 1 5
The ICC also may incorporate case law and other jurisprudence from
national domestic courts to supplement its own, but the court's self-
allowance to do so is tempered by a high level of prudence.16 0  This
tempered ability originates in part from the ICC's close ancestral roots to
cases in trial, one case undergoing appellate review, three cases holding reparation proceedings post-
conviction, and five cases that are closed. Id.
151. Invesligations and Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/ [https://perma.cc/
AD4Q-XTU8].
152. See U.N. Documentafion: International Law, U.N. DAG HAMMARsKJOLD LIBR.,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts [https://perma.cc/R9CY-SNHP] (listing other
international tribunals with past relationships to the U.N.).
153. ICTY, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about [https://perma.cc/7AKP-87GN].
154. Id.
155. U.N. Charter art. 41; Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 145, at 420-22.
156. Caianiello & Illutninati, supra note 145, at 433--34.
157. Id.
158. The ICTR in Brief U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNALS,
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal [https://perma.cc/C39A-LAB4].
159. U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 153. The ICC can
also utilize case law from other international jurisdictions such as the International Court of Justice.
Guillaume, supra note 141, at 20. However, it is not bound to them. Guillaume, supra note 140, at 5,
20.
160. See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 145, at 409-10 (describing how international
tribunals serve as a "laboratory where different cultures and procedural methods are merged" as part
of the ongoing evolution of international law); Guillaume, supra note 140, at 20 (indicating the Court
has remained judicially prudent in looking outside of its own case law to supplement its decisions).
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its ad hoc international criminal tribunal predecessors.1 6 1  Although the
ICTR and the ICTY were also based on the Roman civil law system,162
national domestic law was used to supplement and fill in gaps that their
respective statutes left unexplored.1 6 1 One very notable example is the
ICTY's use of the U.S. Supreme Court's Blockburger test166 in Prosecutor v.
Delalic (also officially known as the "eelebii Case").1 6s The appeals
chamber of the ICTY, faced with alleged error for cumulative convictions
under both war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the same act,
looked to the domestic laws of Zambia, Germany, and the United
161. See Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 145, at 422-23 (explaining the evolution of the
international criminal justice system from the ICTY and ICTR to the ICC and the amount of
continuity between each of the courts).
162. "The precedents of ad hoc tribunals are constantly invoked before the International
Criminal Court, but the Court has adopted a prudent attitude." Guillaume, supra note 140, at 20.
163. See Use of Domestic Law Principles for the Dev. of Int'l Law Study Group,
Int'l Law Ass'n, Report-obannesburg Conference 2016, at 10-11, (2016), https://ila.vettoreweb.com/
Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageld=1616&StorageFileGuid=54c25d0d-3dl8-49c4-8d73-blbecla
346aa [https://perma.cc/WP3W-GXN9] ("[1]nternational criminal courts and tribunals have not
only applied general principles as gap-fillers of the law but also as value-oriented principles to
interpret international rules ... ."). The ad hoc international criminal tribunals often cited to "general
principles" recognized by "civili[z]ed nations" as a means of incorporating national domestic law to
supplement its own. Id. The majority of the time, however, the domestic national jurisprudence
incorporated under a "horizontal move" has originated from seven jurisdictions: United States,
Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy, France, and Belgium. Id. Compared to earlier years, nevertheless,
courts of international jurisdiction have become increasingly "more geographically representative and
the comparative research more varied." Id. at 11; see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-
22-A, judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶f 5, 6, 32-91 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (concluding duress was a mitigating factor for
sentencing and not a complete defense to the charge of crimes against humanity after comparing the
domestic law of thirty nations to find a general principle of law to fill the gap in international law).
164. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("The applicable rule is that,
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." (citing Gavieres v. United States,
220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911))).
165. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, In 401-12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter ( elebi6i Case]. Prosecutor v. Delalic was not the first
time (nor only time) that the ICTY adopted the Blockburger test as a means to prevent double
jeopardy or ne bis in idem. 1Celebidi Case, supra, T 393-96. It was also used in Prosecutor v. Kupreiki in
the ICTY trial chamber. Prosecutor v. Kupreikic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, IT 678-700 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Kupreiki6, Trial judgment].
However, the tielebid appeals chamber's recognition of the Blockburger test preceded that of Kuprlki.
See Kupreiki, Trial Judgment, supra, ¶ 387 n.618 (referencing the delebidi Case's use of the Blockburger
test on appeal).
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States.'1 6  The tribunal also examined the jurisprudence principle utilized
by a post-World War II U.S. military tribunal.1 6 ' The appeals chamber
concluded that for "reasons of fairness" and because "only distinct crimes
may justify multiple convictions," the Blockburger test was to be used as the
evaluating standard for multiple convictions based on the same act.'
V. POSSIBLE CHARGES AGAINST PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD UNDER THE
RoME STATUTE
As referenced earlier, President al-Assad has been accused of a litany of
war crimes and crimes against humanity-two of the four offense
categories within the jurisdiction of the ICC.169  However, what these
might specifically look like, as pertaining to the Ghouta- attacks, has not
been explored or, at the very least, not publicly detailed.1 70 Although the
public at large is not privy to what might be crucial information, it is still
possible to extrapolate a series of potential charges from the facts
publically known about the events at Ghouta.
Under the Rome Statute and the facts presented above, numerous
portions of Article 7 and Article 8 would be invoked. However, Article 8
offers two subsets of offenses that are generally distinct from each
other.171 Furthermore, all offenses under Article 8, including these two
subsets, are further elaborated and expanded in Elements of Crimes, adopted
by the ICC under Article 9 although only as a non-binding-though highly
166. lelebi6i Case, supra note 165, IN 401-09.
167. Id.¶¶410-11.
168. Id ¶¶ 412. The ICTY also faced a related allegation of error-based on cumulative
charging of the same act-on appeal from the trial chamber. Id 400. The appeals chamber held
that cumulative charging is allowed for a variety of reasons, which includes the lack of certainty over
which charges will result in conviction. Id. ¶ 400.
169. See UN Implicates Basbar al-Assad in Syria War Crimes, supra note 17 (citing U.N. Human
Right's Chief, Navi Pillay, for the proposition that "[t]he UN's commission of inquiry into Syria has
produced 'massive evidence ... [of] very serious crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity . . ." ;
see also U.N. Indep. Int'l Comm'n Rep., sKpra note 17 (detailing numerous repeated violations of
international law including the use of prohibited chemical weapons, war conduct disregarding
international conventions regarding non-combatants, indiscriminate targeting during military
operations, and unlawful killings). Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Rome Statute, supra
note 103, art 5, 6-8.
170. See UN ImpAcates Bashar al-Assad in Syria War Crimes, supra note 17 (indicating names and
specific evidence were not publically released due to potential ICC prosecution).
171. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(xxvi) (listing general war crime
provisions requiring an international armed conflict nexus), with id. art. 8(2)(c)-(f) (listing general war
crime offenses requiring an armed conflict nexus "not of an international character").
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persuasive-assistive tool of interpretation.1 72  While many of the
offenses in each subset, with some exceptions, run parallel to offenses in
the other, determining which subset is to be utilized can depend on the
classification of the conflict at the time of the Ghouta attacks.7  For the
scenario's purposes here, though still debatable, it will be assumed that the
armed conflict in Syria was not of an international nature at the time.174
Evidentiary standards will also be overlooked since the full range of
evidence and its credibility, at this point in time, has been kept
confidential. Therefore, we will assume, for the time being, that the
evidence sufficiently links the perpetrator (al-Assad) to the conduct.
172. Under Article 9 of the Rome Statute:
1. Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7
and 8. They shall be adopted by two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of
State Parties.
3. The Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.
Id. art. 9. Elements of Crimes, in cases where the Rome Statute's provisions list multiple offenses in a
single provision, separates out each offense and provides the necessary elements for each offense.
Int'l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes, art. 6-8 (2011) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. Utilizing the same
organizational structure as the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes lists out forty-six offenses pertaining
to international armed conflicts and twenty-one offenses "not of an international character." Id
art. 8(2)(a)-(e). The eleven offenses expanding the provisions of Article 8(2)(a), moreover, deal with
"[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 . . ." Id. art. 8(2)(a).
Although the Elements of Crimes is intended to be merely an assistive tool of interpretation, it is a
highly persuasive authority for the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 9. Under the "general law
provision" of Article 21, the Rome Statute lists Elements of Crimes immediately subsequent to the
Rome Statute itself as a primary source of authority. Id. art. 21; see also Bassiouni - LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 143, at 162-63 (discussing the interplay of Article 21 and Article 9 in the Rome
Statute with regard to Elements of Crimes). Refer also to supra note 136 discussing a proposed
methodical order for interpretation of different authorities.
173. Compare Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(a)-(b) (requiring an international
armed conflict nexus for specific war crime offenses), with id. art 8(2)(c)-(e) (recognizing specific war
crime offenses where an armed conflict nexus was "not of an international character").
174. See Syria in Civil War, Red Cross Says, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-188496362 [https://perma.cc/M94E-4JK8.1]
(reporting the International Committee of the Red Cross's official determination that the Syrian
conflict was a "non-international armed conflict"-or civil war-by July 2012, roughly a year prior to
the Ghouta attacks). Syrian regime forces were largely focusing on combatting internal elements as
opposed to foreign armed forces. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the conflict was of an
"international character" at the time given the involvement of a number of foreign powers funding
various factions of the conflict. Id.
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Furthermore, to keep things simple, it will be assumed that the Ghouta
attacks were a single continuous action even though they could constitute
discrete attacks on multiple locations."' Under this "armed conflict not
of an international character"'7 6 classification and other assumptions, the
potential charges in an indictment against al-Assad could include:
The crime against humanity of murder;'7 7
The crime against humanity of extermination;7
The crime against humanity of other inhumane acts;"7
The war crime of attacking civilians; 8 0
The war crime of employing poison or poisoned weapons;'8  and
The war crime of employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or
devices.18 2
It is more than likely that the defense will object to many of these
charges for violating double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) principles.'8 Under
175. "A distinction is laid down in adjudged cases and in text-writers between an offense
continuous in its character, like the one at bar, and a case where the statute is aimed at an offense that
can be committed uno ictu." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932) (quoting Ex parte
Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 286 (1887)).
176. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(c)-(e).
177. Id. art. 7(1)(a). The charge of murder as a war crime offense could also be charged. Id.
art. 8(2)(c)(i). Furthermore, given the initial-appearing similarity between the crime against humanity
of murder and the war crime offense of murder, it may be prudent to include the latter as an
alternative offense, regardless of whether it is charged or not.
178. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
179. Id. art. 7(1)(k).
180. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(i).
181. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii).
182. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiv).
183. Double jeopardy, referred to as ne bis in idem in international law, is statutorily provided
for in Article 20 of the Rome Statute:
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect
to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or
acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which
that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under
article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the
proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
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the elebili Case, however, cumulative charging of offenses for the same
acts is "generally permissible.""' The rationale is that "it is not possible
to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an
accused will be proven."1 8 s Cumulative charges, therefore, enable the trial
chamber to be "better poised, after the parties' presentation of evidence,
to evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence."1 ' Furthermore, under the jurisprudence
constante of the Court, the practice of cumulative charging based on the
same nucleus of facts seems to be well-established precedent under
international law.187
Provided the ICC accepts the charges in this hypothetical indictment,
there is sufficient evidence to fulfill the elements of most-if not all-of
the charges. Nevertheless, some of the charges could be found to have
less plausible substance than others. This would largely depend on how
the ICC would construct the statutory language in these elements. The
possible directions on the interpretation of each element warrants
examination in order to determine its probability of success in surviving as
a potential charge.
A. The Crime Against Humanity ofMurder
The crime against humanity of murder is applicable when: (1) "[t]he
perpetrator killed one or more persons;" (2) "[t]he conduct was committed
as a part of a widespread system or systematic attack directed against a
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the
norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice.
Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 20. However, since the statutory language is very broad, as
mentioned above, the Blockburger test has been adopted as a supplemental tool for procedural
purposes. See Ctelebici Case, supra note 165, ¶ 412 (finding "only distinct crimes may justify multiple
convictions" under the Blockburger test).
184. See Prosecutor v. Kupreikic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, I 384-86 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) (citing (elebiki Case, supra note 165, T 400)
[hereinafter Kupreikic, Appeals Judgment] (validating the notion that cumulative charging of the
same offenses is generally allowable).
185. Lelebici Case, supra note 165, ¶ 400.
186. Id.
187. See id. ("In addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this
Tribunal and the ICTR.").
1952017]
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civilian population;" and (3) "[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct was
part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population."' In the facts presented above, it is
clear that the attacks were both "widespread" geographically and
"systematic" in their coordinated nature as a military operation.'8 9
Although the Prosecution will only have to prove one or the other, both
can easily be proven here.190 Knowledge and intent could easily be
inferred from the regime-leadership's familiarity with the target area and
the regime's efforts to eliminate the evidence.9" Furthermore, the large
death toll for civilians in an urban area where a substantial number of
civilians were present more than satisfies the first and third elements.192
The prosecutor, nevertheless, may encounter some resistance by the
defense on the issue of whether the attacks were "directed against a
civilian population."' The defense is likely to assert that the primary
188. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(l)(a).
189. Id.
190. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, T 94 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Kordid, Appeal Judgment] ("[T]he
phrase 'widespread' refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted persons,
while the phrase 'systematic' refers to the organised nature of the acts of violence.").
191. See Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68 (reporting on the sustained conventional
artillery barrages as an effort to destroy evidence, and the U.S. interception of Syrian regime
communications which expressed concern about being caught with the use of chemical weapons).
192. See Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, supra note 3 (concluding the death toll total
ranged from 200 people to 1,300).
193. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(1)(a). International courts have also weighed in
on what must be shown regarding the attack's target:
It is sufficient to show that enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that
they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed
against a civilian 'population', rather than against a limited and randomly selected number of
individuals.
Kordi6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 190, ¶ 95 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 &
23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 90). Alternatively, the defense may argue that prior indiscriminate
attacks on civilian populations by anti-regime forces justifies any alleged indiscriminate attacks by the
regime based on the tu quoque principle of reciprocal obligations-the failure of one to observe one's
obligations allows reciprocation in kind. See Alex Thomson, Syria Chemical Weapons: Finger Pointed at
fihadists, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2013 12:18 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/syria/9950036/syria-chemical-weapons-finger-pointed-at-jihadists.htrmi [https://perma.
cc/PHN6-YM64] (reporting on the Syrian regime's accusation of a potential chemical weapons
attack at Khan al-Assal by an anti-government jihadist group). However, international case law has
amply rejected the tu quoque justification as a legal defense (or an affirmative defense) for criminal
acts. See Kupreiki6, Trial Judgment, supra note 165, IM 515-16 (citing 12 U.N. WAR CRIMEs
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targets of the attacks were not civilians, but rather the anti-regime forces
positioned in the area."' Al-Assad could assert that civilian victims were
only secondary victims. Therefore, under this contention, even if civilian
casualties were a secondary goal, the attacks would not be "directed against
a civilian population."
The answer to this question, however, would depend on the court's
determination of whether "the status of the victim as a civilian and the
scale on which [the act] is committed or the level of organization involved
characterize a crime against humanity.""'s "In the case of attacks on
military objectives causing damage to civilians, international law contains a
general principle prescribing that reasonable care must be taken in
attacking military objectives so that civilians are not needlessly injured
through carelessness.""6 The likely factors that the ICC will rely on
include: (1) "the means and method" of the attack; (2) "the status of the
victims;" (3) the number of victims; (4) "the discriminatory nature of the
attack;" (5) "the nature of the crimes committed in its course;" (6) "the
resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the
attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with
the precautionary requirements of the laws of war."197
64 (1949), (the defense of tu quoque was raised in trials subsequent o the Second World War and was
universally rejected). "The tu quoque argument ... envisages humanitarian law as based upon a
narrow bilateral exchange of rights and obligations. Instead, the bulk of this body of law lays down
absolute obligations, namely obligations that are unconditional or in other words not based on
reciprocity." Kupreikid, Trial judgment, supra note 165, ¶ 517; see also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Conflict (Protocol I) art. 51, adoptedJune 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978)
[hereinafter Protocol 1] (categorizing attacks on civilians "by way of reprisals" as absolutey prohibited).
"Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal
obligations with respect o the civilian population and civilians .... Protocol I, supra, art. 51(7).
194. See Prosecutor v. Blalkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 103 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) [hereinafter Blaikid Case, Appeal Judgment] (outlining
the defense's argument that the attack's primary objective was not civilians-since it was not the
subjective intent-even though civilians were inevitably killed).
195. Id. T 107.
196. Kupreiki6, Trial Judgment, supra note 165, T 524.
197. Blaiki6 Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶ 106 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 90 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June 12, 2002)); see also Prosecutor v. Martid, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgment, T 246-61 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Marti6 Case] (finding Martid guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity for an artillery attack utilizing indiscriminate M-87 Orkan
rockets dispersing bomblets "directed against a civilian population").
2017] 197
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Here, regime forces conducted the attacks using weapons known to be
inaccurate and cause widespread damage over a large area.1 9 s
Furthermore, the timing of the attacks in relation to the weather
conditions strongly implies that the attacks were calculated to not only be
indiscriminate, but also to maximize the death toll of all inhabitants of the
area-including civilians hiding in bunkers.1 '9  The added effect of
utilizing sarin gas-a prohibited chemical weapon-reinforces any notion
that regime forces exercised any discrimination in the specific aiming at
valid military targets. The attacks, therefore, will most likely be found by
the court to have been "directed against a civilian population."200 Since
this would satisfy the second element, that the conduct was an "attack
directed against a civilian population," the prosecution would likely have a
strong case for conviction for the crime against humanity of murder.2 01
B. The Crime Against Humaniy of Extermination .
The crime against humanity of extermination shares several elements of
its intra-article counterpart of the offense of murder detailed above.0 2
198. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 21, 23; HRW - ANALYsIs ON GHOUTA,
supra note 26, at 5, 7-9 (discussing the intentional design of the unguided rockets used at Ghouta to
be inaccurate, indiscriminate in inflicting widespread damage, and specially designed for potential
chemical weapon payloads). Under Protocol I:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate acts are: (a) [t]hose which are not directed
at a specific military objective; (b) [tihose which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) [t]hose which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or
civilian objects without distinction.
Protocol 1, supra note 193, art. 41(4).
199. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 7.
200. By comparison, the facts here far exceed the magnitude of very analogous facts that led
to the ICTY's guilty verdict in Marid. Martik Case, supra note 197, ¶ 246-61. Therefore, it would be
very improbable that the ICC would deviate from the suggested conclusion.
201. Elements of Cimes, supra note 172, art. 7(1)(a).
202. The elements for the extermination offense under Article 7 are:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the destruction of a part of a population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing of members of a civilian
population.
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The divergence from the "murder" offense, however, lies in the first two
elements.2 0 3 This will require the prosecutor, in addition to the elements
of "murder," to show that the regime forces created deadly "conditions of
life calculated" to be a part of a "mass killing" of the civilian population in
the Ghouta region.204 The focus of the offense of extermination is the
"massiveness" or "scale" of conduct (or patterns of conduct) to bring
about the death of the targeted group.2 0 5 Here, the prosecutor may
simply point to the regime's dispersal of poisonous gases at Ghouta as the
use of weapons of mass destruction.2 0 6 Additionally, the prosecutor
could also point out that the Ghouta attacks were but one instance of a
prior pattern of use against politically dissenting civilian populations.2 0 7
Using this dual-prong approach, the court could find enough evidence to
support the "massiveness" focus of the conduct for the offense of
extermination.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
Id. art. 7(1) (b). The third and fourth elements are universal to all of the offenses listed in Article 7
as crimes against humanity. Id. art. 7.
203. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
204. Id.
205. See Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Appeal
Judgement, T 516 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Dec. 13, 2004) ("Extermination differs from murder in
that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not required for murder[;]' . . . [t]he
expressions 'on a large scale' or 'large number' do not, however, suggest a numerical minimum."
(internal citations omitted)). "As a crime against humanity, for the purposes of the ICTR Statute, the
act of killing must occur within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian
population for national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." Id. Here, in addition to the use
of chemical weapons, the attacks were timed to strike right after the morning Muslim prayer, where
civilians were congregated and more exposed. HRW - ANALYSIS ON GHOUTA, supra note 26, at 4.
206. See Chemical Weapons, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.un.
org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/ [https://perma.cc/M5C-RPH2] [hereinafter Chemical Weapons,
UNODA] (listing chemical weapons as one of the three recognized categories of weapons of mass
destruction).
207. See U.N. Mission - Final Report, supra note 9, at 10-21 (summarizing the results of its
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C. The Crime Against Humanity of Other Inhumane Acts
"Other inhumane acts" could be offered as a catch-all charge to the
other intra-article offense charged.208 The prosecutor could also offer it
as an alternative charge in light of double jeopardy concerns.209 However,
the prosecution could have the most success in using the offense as a
means of trying the regime leadership for the more amorphous crime of
"inflicting terror."2 1 0
The differing elements of inhumane acts from the above offenses are:
(1) "[t]he perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or
to mental or physical health by means of an inhumane act;" (2) "[s]uch act
was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7,
paragraph 1, of the Statute;" and (3) "[t]he perpetrator was aware of the
factual circumstances that established the character of the act."21" The
offense itself, as noted in case law, was "deliberately designed as a residual
category, as it was felt undesirable for this category to be exhaustively
enumerated. An exhaustive categorization would merely create
208. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(l)(k).
209. See infra Part D.
210. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13-(2), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II]
(prohibiting acts that cause the "spread of terror among the civilian population"). In this instance,
"terrorist attack" would refer to the regime's purposeful selection of the methods-and-means of
attack and the selection of targets as a tactic in dispersing a message of fear amongst the civilian
population as well as active participants in anti-regime forces. See Peter Knoope, About Fear, Terrorism
and What is Really New, INT'L CTR. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM-THE HAGUE (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://icctnl/publication/about-fear-terrorism-and-what-is-really-new/ [https://perma.cc/PM4H-
DC8K ] ("The impact of a terrorist attack transcends beyond its immediate action in terms of time,
geographic space and direct victims ... [T]errorist acts are a form of communication."); G.A. Res.
52/164, annex, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 19(2)
(Jan. 9, 1998) ("Noting further that terrorist attacks by means of explosives or other lethal devices
have become increasingly widespread."). However, in this case it could be applied given the
involvement of Branch 450 of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 68. The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre claims to be a purely
civilian agency. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Three Entities Targeted for Supporting
Syria's WMD Proliferation (Jan. 4, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/
Pages/hp216.aspx [https://perma.cc/9EXE-W3KN]. However, its allegedly civilian personnel were
heavily involved in the preparation of the chemical weapons for use at Ghouta. Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 68. Theoretically, this could estop the regime from claiming that the attacks
were completed by their armed forces and therefore outside the treaty's technical definition for
terrorism.
211. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(1)(k).
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opportunity for evasion of the letter of the prohibition." 2 12  Moreover,
the crime itself must be of "gravity comparable" to other, more explicitly
listed, offenses in Article 7 and effectively constitute a "serious attack
upon human dignity." 2 13 This, however, could potentially trigger a nullum
crimen defense, because this offense is not explicitly defined.2 1 4
Here, the prosecutor could submit to the court that the nature of the
Ghouta chemical attacks, in addition to causing death and destruction,
were intended to instill a message of terror among the civilian population
in violation of customary international law.2 1s International case law (as
incorporated into customary international law) has declared the
components of the crime of terror to include:
1. Acts of violence directed against the civilian population or individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing death or serious
injury to body or health within the civilian population.
2. The offender willfully made the civilian population or individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of
violence.
3. The above offence was committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population.21 6
The indiscriminate nature of the weapons used and of the locations
attacked would more than satisfy the actus reus component of the crime of
terror. 217 Whether the acts or threats actually inflict terror amongst the
212. Kordic, Appeal Judgment, supra note 190, ¶ 117 (citing Kupreiki6, Trial Judgment, supra
note 165, 1563).
213. Elements of Cimes, supra note 172, art. 7; see also Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Trial Judgment, 1 152-54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (labeling
inhumane acts such as "serious attacks upon the human dignity of the victim" as crimes against
humanity).
214. See Kordi6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 190, T 94 (noting "nullum wrmen sine lege" refers to
the principle that there is no crime possible unless there is a law prohibiting the specified conduct
giving "fair notice" to the prospective defendant).
215. See Protocol H, supra note 210, art. 13(2) ("Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.").
216. Prosecutor v. Galin, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, T 100 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006).
217. See id. T 102 ("[T]he acts or threats of violence constitutive of the crime of terror shall
not however be limited to direct attacks against civilians or threats thereof but may include
2017] 201
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civilian population would not be necessary to uphold a conviction.2 1 8
Under the mens rea component, however, the prosecution would have to
offer evidence of the "specific intent to spread terror" as an underlying
intent ("primary purpose") of the chemical attacks.2 19 This would only
require that one "primary purpose" of the attack was used to spread terror
although other purposes might exist.2 2 0 As stated in the Gaid appeal
opinion:
The fact that other purposes may have coexisted simultaneously with the
purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population would not
disprove this charge provided that the intent to spread terror ... was
principal among the aims. Such intent can be inferred from the
circumstances of the acts or threats, that is from their nature, manner, timing
and duration.221
In terms of making the needed inference of intent, the facts of the case
here show the inference to be "irresistible." 2 22  The regime deliberately
utilized chemical weapons, a weapon of mass destruction, and
indiscriminately targeted multiple areas that were home to a large number
of civilians.22 ' Additionally, the attacks were made in a manner in which
the potency of the weapons would be maximized in bringing about death
and serious injury to its victims. 2  Among the dead were large numbers
indiscriminate or [disproportionate] attacks or threats thereof ... [T]he crime of acts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population" is reflected
in "a case of 'extensive trauma and psychological damage' being caused by 'attacks [which] were





222. In Gaid, the trial chamber and the appeals chamber agreed that there was:
"[A]n irreistible inference to be drawn from the evidence on the Trial Record that what the Trial
Chamber has found to be widespread and notorious attacks against the civilian population of
Sarajevo could not have occurred without it being the will of the commander of those forces
which perpetrated it ... [and thus] was deliberate."
Id. ¶ 108 (emphasis added).
223. Syria CbemicalAtack What We Know, supra note 3.
224. See U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, sJpra note 7, at 7 (reporting the weather conditions
were ideal for increasing the potency of chemical weapon deadliness for sarin gas); HRW - Analysis
on Ghouta, supra note 26, at 4 (observing the likelihood of the population's increased vulnerability
and exposure to chemical attacks given that the morning prayers had ended shortly before the
initiation of the attacks).
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of women and children.2  Of those civilians that survived, the mass
majority reported the death of at least two family members as a result of
the attacks.2" As is expected of chemical weapons use, the attacks also
afflicted first responders thereby adding to the psychological trauma.2 2 7
In the context of other suspected uses of chemical weapons, an inference
is almost not even required to interpret the clear message of fear from the
attack on Ghouta that "transcends beyond its immediate action in terms of
time, geographic space and direct victims." 2 28
D. The War Crime ofAttacking Civilians
War crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute are distinguished from
Article 7 crimes against humanity offenses by the included nexus of the
offense to an armed conflict.22 9  Civilians are included as members of a
protected class from attack during or in connection with armed conflicts
under the Geneva Conventions.23 0 Attacking civilians in connection with
225. Syria ChemicalAttack: What We Know, supra note 3.
226. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 19.
227. Id.
228. Knoope, supra, note 210.
229. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 8 (listing war crime offenses during either an
"international armed conflict," "armed conflict not of an international character," or both) with
Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. (7) (listing elements for various crimes against humanity).
230. "Common Article 3," identical throughout Geneva Conventions I-IV, protects
"[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms . . . " in an ongoing "armed conflict not of an international character." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of the Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. Although the armed conflict nexus was
maintained, the protections afforded to this class of persons under Common Article 3 was extended
in Protocol I beyond its original scope to include any conflict "without any adverse distinction based
on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties
to the conflict." Protocol I, supra note 193, Preamble.
Under Part IV, the "basic rule" for ensuring "respect and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects" requires that "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Id. art. 48 (emphasis added).




Cho: Chemical Weapon Attacks in Ghouta
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
ST. MARY'S LAI /JOURNAL
an armed conflict is, therefore, a listed offense under the Rome Statute in
both the internal armed conflict and international armed conflict
scenarios.231 Under the ICC's Elements of Crimes, the elements for the
offense are: (1) "[t]he perpetrator directed an attack;" (2) "[t]he object of
the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities;" (3) "[t]he perpetrator intended the civilian
population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in the
hostilities to be the object of the attack;" (4) "[t]he conduct took place in
the context of and was associated with [as applicable here] an armed
conflict not of an international character;" and (5) "[t]he perpetrator was
aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict." 2 3 2
Here, the added element of a nexus to an armed conflict and the
perpetrator's awareness of it is safely presumed. Additionally, the
remaining listed elements can be proven in a near identical manner with
near identical evidence as its inter-article counterparts-Article 7's crime
against humanity for murder,23 3 or alternatively, crime against humanity
for extermination.2 34  However, a crucial distinction can be made in
crossing the inter-article divide from crimes against humanity into the
realm of war crimes. The war crime offenses reveal a focus on specific
mens rea components-the intentional decision to attack and its subsequent
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.... [M]ilitary objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
Id. art. 52(2).
Protocol I also requires proportionalty in the calculus of a military attack in which civilians are
likely to be harmed. "An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" is therefore prohibited. Id. art. 51(5)(b)
(emphasis added).
231. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 8(b)(i), (e)(i).
232. Elements of Crimes, spra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(i). Alternatively, the same elements are
required for international armed conflict related attacks on civilians under Article 8(2)(b)(i). Id.
art. 8(2)(b)(i).
233. Id. art. 7(1)(a). Refer to the earlier discussion of the elements for "the crime against
humanity of murder." Supra note 188.
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orchestration; a deliberate and/or intentional disregard of the obligations
to (1) discriminate in military targeting, (2) use proportionate force, and
(3) safeguard members of protected classes; and the contextual mental
awareness of an armed conflict.2 3 6  In terms of the offense of attacking
235. Under Elements of Crimes, the various elements for each offense listed are generally
separated and sequentially ordered by (1) conduct, (2) consequences (results), and (3) circumstance.
Id., art. 7 Intro. Any mental elements are listed after the affected conduct, consequence, or
circumstance, and any contextual circumstances are listed last. Id In terms of the war crime of
attacking civilians, the conduct element is "the perpetrator directed an attack." Id. art. 8(2)(e)(i). The
circumstance of the conduct is that the attack targeted a civilian population as its military objective.
Id art. 7 Intro. The mental element is the intention of the attack to, target a civilian population. Id.
art. 8(2)(e)(iii). As a war crime, the offense next includes the "contextual circumstance" element of
the offense's nexus to an armed conflict. Id. art. 7 Intro. It is followed by another "mental element
affecting" the contextual circumstance element that requires the perpetrator to have actual
knowledge of the armed conflict. Id.
236. Compare id. art. 8(2)(e)(i) (singling out as separate elements, the violative yet intended object
of the attack, the actual awareness of the context of the attack in an armed conflict, and the perpetrator's
direction (decision) that the attack take place in disregard of its violative nature), with id. art. 7(1)(b)
(looking to the result of violative conduct, its role in a larger scheme of similar achievement, and the
conduct's context in a "widespread or systematic attack" as known by the perpetrator).
There are some areas where the inter-article divergence is not as readily apparent. See e.g., id.
art. 8(2)(a)(i) (listing the result-oriented focus of the first element common to Article 7 offenses-
"[t]he perpetrator killed one or more persons"-in the war crime of willful killing). This is in part
due to some overlap between the concepts of Crimes Against Humanity (originally applied primarily
against nation-states) and War Crimes (allowing prosecutorial application against individuals). See
generally, id. art. 7 (focusing on the results of an "attack directed against a civilian population"); id.
art. 8 (requiring the perpetrator's awareness of an armed conflict in the decision to attack a civilian
population). However, the result-oriented element is present in only a minority of the offenses listed
under war crimes. See id. art. 8(2)(a), (2)(c) (outlining Article 8 offenses that identify an element
related to the result of illegal conduct similar to Article 7 offenses). A majority of Article 8 offenses
do not include a result-oriented component at all. Id. art. 8. Moreover, even under those Article 8
offenses in the minority, there still exists a gravitation in focus on the decisional disregard of the
Geneva Conventions and customary international law on the rules of war. See e.g., id. art. 8(2)(a)(i)
(associating the result-oriented element of having "killed one or more persons" with the specific mens
rea component-intentional disregard of the perpetrator's actual knowledge of the victims' protected status
in the context of an armed conflict).
Therefore, at the risk of over-simplification, several conclusions might be safely reached. First,
it appears that the crimes against humanity category focuses on the overall mass effect (result) of
conduct violating a recognized legal obligation (without an armed conflict nexus), whereas the war
crimes category focuses on the intentional decision-assuming successful execution-to violate that
same legal obligation (with an armed conflict nexus). Second, distinguishing between the two
chapters in dealing with a common nucleus of facts appears to be determined by the express (and
presumably intentional) statutory-like separation of the elements. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
[the express mention of one excludes all others]. See id. art. 7 (including only that the attack target a
civilian population); Int'l Crim. Ct., Id. art. 8 (requiring that the perpetrator be aware of "the existence
2017] 205
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civilians as a war crime, the mens rea revolves around the direction of the
attack (as the conduct) and not the attack itself.23 7  It is safe to say that the
decision to attack-with its requisite advanced planning and subsequent
orchestration-against a densely populated urban district utilizing
indiscriminate weapons with payloads of mass destruction sufficiently
covers any additional mens rea focus. 2" This leaves the charge of attacking
civilians as a war crime in a more than a viable state.
E. The War Crime of Employing Poison or Poisoned Weapons, and the War Crime
of Employing Prohibited Gases, Liquids, Materials or Devices
The "war crimes of employing poison or poisoned weapons" and the
"war crime of employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices"
share a number of common roots, including history.2 4 0 Consequently, the
of an armed conflict"); Expressio unius est exclusio alternus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
("A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative.").
For instance, in Article 8 for war crimes, elements dealing with the mental components are
separated out to out-populate the single element, if any, dealing with the result-oriented components
of the offense. See, e.g., Elements ofCrimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(i) (enumerating the elements of
the crime against humanity of extermination). In reverse fashion, under Article 7 for crimes against
humanity, the center of focus is the offense's result with the mental component as a tangential
qualifier. E.g., id. art. 7(1)(b). The result-oriented component-or "consequence" element which
often remains unseparated from the "conduct" element-is listed first, followed by the "contextual
circumstance" element of the "widespread or systematic attack" requirement in Article 7 offenses.
See id. art. 7 Intro (discussing the Elements of Crimes author's deliberate sequencing of elements based
on its character and qualifying properties). The contextual circumstance element is always followed
by a "mental element affecting" the contextual circumstance and not the result-or at least, not
directly. See, e.g., id. art. 7(1)(b) (identifying the elements of the crime against humanity of
extermination).
237. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(i).
238. Id.
239. See id. art. 8(2)(e)(i) (detailing the elements of the war crime of attacking civilians); U.N.
Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at -5 (assessing the Ghouta attack's impact on the civilian
population).
240. Although banned multilaterally in The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the
modern use of chemical weapons begins with World War I. Chemical Weapons, UNODA, supra
note 206. During the course of the war, both factions conducted attacks involving the incorporation
of chemical agents into artillery shells and other munitions as a means of increasing battlefield
casualties through death or debilitating suffering. Id. The Hague Convention of 1899, although
largely ignored, initially prohibited "the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiation or deleterious gases." Hague Convention (IV,2) Laws of War. Declaration on the Use
of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29,
1899. In part because of the hypothetical scenario where chemical agents could be delivered through
non-projectile means, The Hague Convention of 1907 changed and separated the language into the
206 [Vol. 49:165
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language employed in both offenses shares familiar statutory language to
the common historical lineage.2 4 1  As a war crime, the common two
elements of the armed conflict nexus and the perpetrator's awareness of
the armed conflict are required as a matter of course.24 2  The additional
required elements specific to the criminal employment of poison or
poisoned weapons include:
1. The perpetrator employed a substance or a weapon that releases a
substance as a result of its employment.
2. The substance was such that it causes death or serious damage to
health in the ordinary course of events, through its toxic
properties.24
Similarly, the required elements specific to the criminal employment of
prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices include:
1. The perpetrator employed a gas or other analogous substance or
device.
2. The gas, substance or device was such that it causes death or serious
damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its
asphyxiating or toxic properties. 2
As applied to the events at Ghouta, the facts are sufficient to satisfy the
elements for both offenses. The employment of Sarin (deployed in liquid
prohibitions against "employ[ing] poison or poisonous weapons," and "employ[ing] arms, projectiles,
or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, art. 23 Oct. 18, 1907; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A
PERSONAL MEMOIR 10 (1992). The outrage following World War I sparked the signing of the
Geneva Protocol in 1925, which prohibited, as universally accepted international law, "the use in war
of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices .... "
Geneva Protocol, supra note 14; Chemical Weapons, UNODA, supra note 206. However, one of the
loopholes in the Geneva Protocol was that it did not prohibit the further development and
stockpiling of chemical weapons. Id. This was rectified by very broad prohibitions in the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1992. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 16, art. 1.
241. WILIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE 278-79 (2d ed. 2016).
242. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii).
243. Id.
244. Id art. 8(2)(e)(xv).
2017) 207
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form but converted to a gas upon impact) satisfies the "substance"
requirement245  for the poison offense, as well as the offense for
employment of a gas.2 4 6  Sarin, given its effects on the human body,2 4 7
satisfies both the "toxic properties" as well as the "asphyxiating"
characteristic requirement under the second elements.24" The use of
Soviet M-14 and 330mm "Volcano" rockets carrying payloads of Sarin also
fulfills the offered delivery system alternatives offered in each of the
offenses' first elements.2 4 9
The problem with these two listed offenses is not a question of whether
they are chargeable, but rather, whether they are actually (despite their
historical evolution) the same offense. A brief inspection reveals that the
first listed offense-referring to the employment of a "substance" as the
conduct element-seems broader than the other, since the other gravitates
toward a gas, albeit with the allowance of analogous substitutes.2 5 0
Furthermore, the former contemplates the use of a delivery system which
the latter does not.2"' The facts of the case, however, could be
determinative in whether such a violation exists. As such-since the facts
of the case can2 52 satisfy the elements of both offenses-charging both
viable offenses in the alternative would seem prudent.253
245. It is worth noting, as relating to the underlying dichotomy between the war crimes and
cnmes against humanity categories, both offenses discussed here, neither one requires the actual
death or injury of its target. They only require that the perpetrator employ "a gas or other analogous
substance." Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xiv).
246. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xy).
247. U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 7.
248. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xv).
249. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii) (referring to "a weapon that releases a substance as a result of its
employment").
250. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xv).
251. Compare id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii) ("The perpetrator employed a substance or a weapon that
releases a substance as a result of its employment."), with id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiv) ("The perpetrator
employed a gas or other analogous substance or device.").
252. Under the first element for employing poison or poisoned weapons, the fact a rocket-
artillery delivery system was utilized (to carry Sarin) may be used to satisfy the first element instead of
the fact that Satin itself was utilized. See id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii) (including, as part of the element, the use
of "a substance or a weapon that releases a substance as a result of its employment."). Although this
application of differing facts may technically escape the potential for a double jeopardy violation
legalistically, it is questionable if the ICC's judiciary will accept it.
253. Although multiple charging is allowed, since the conviction of one might preclude the
conviction of the other, giving due consideration to judicial resources may be the wiser course.
[Vol. 49:165208
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VI. LOOKING FOR POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
NE BIS INIDEM (DOUBLE JEOPARDY)
Although multiple charging from a common nucleus of fact is allowed,
multiple convictions resulting from those charges is a different story. It
should be expected that multiple charges will give rise to the defense
argument that many of the charged offenses are in fact lesser-included-
offenses of other charges (concours apparent)54 or alternatively, the same
offense in fact.25 5  If historical case law is afforded any authoritative
weight by the ICC, this defense argument will find only minimal success.
The Blockburger test, as expressed by the appeals chamber in both KupreLki
and the (elebii, determines whether the crimes are distinct:
[M]ultiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provision
but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory
provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the
other. An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a
fact not required by the other.
Where this test is not met, the Chamber must decide in relation to which
offence it will enter a conviction. This should be done on the basis of the
principle that the conviction under the more specific provision should be
upheld.2 5 6
The (elebii court used this test to determine that even very similar
offenses arising from the same core facts could result in technically distinct
254. Concours apparent is a false or apparent concurrence where one charged offense is
completely encompassed by another in addressing the same conduct (lesser-included offense). Kai
Ambos, Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L., 715, 723 (2009).
Concours ideal, on the other hand, is where a single course of conduct gives rise to two distinctly
separate offenses concurrently. Id. Concours ideal does not violate the ne bis in idem principle. See
Gerard Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in InternationalLaw, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv., 217, 217 (2003) (describing
ne his in idem at double jeopardy).
255. The ne his in idem principle is expressly incorporated in the Rome Statute under Article 20.
The relevant provision for the situation at hand states in relevant part that: "[e]xcept as provided in
this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis
of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court." Rome Statute, supra
note 103, art. 20(1).
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convictions." However, the tribunal applied it in both directions in
order to not only avoid conviction on the same offense twice, but also to
257. The international adoption of the Blockburger test as a means of preventing double
jeopardy is not a complete adoption of the protection afforded in the United States. Dax Eric Lopez,
Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereagnty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent Non Bis In Idem,
33 VAND. J. TRANSAT'L L. 1263, 1291-92 (2000) (describing the difficulty in applying the Blockburger
test internationally). The adopted portion arguably focuses too much on language and format
technicalities and statutory construction happenstance rather than the substance of the crime. Id. A
deeper examination of double jeopardy protections in the United States reveals, arguably, a more
balanced approach. Id. at 1302.
Texas law, for instance, may offer insight on how the ICC may craft a better approach. In
a double jeopardy challenge arising out of multiple convictions from a single trial, the appellate court
must first apply the Blockburger test as a starting point using the cognate-pleadings approach.
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (asking whether each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not); Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 526, 535, 537
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (adopting the cognate-pleadings approach which "looks to the facts and
elements as alleged in the charging instrument, and not just the statutory elements of the offense").
Second, the appellate court then considers the non-exclusive list of Ends factors in determining if the
two offenses are in fact "the same." Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Ex
parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, application of the Ervin factors
will vary depending on the results of the Blockburger test. If the elements of the offenses are identical
under Blockburger, there is a judicial presumption that the offenses are the same absent clear legislative
intent to the contrary; if they are different, the judicial presumption is that the offenses are different
absent clear legislative intent. Ex parte Benson, 459 S.W.3d 67, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
The Ervin factors, include:
(1) whether [the] offenses are in the same statutory section;
(2) whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative;
(3) whether the offenses are named similarly;
(4) whether the offenses have common punishment ranges;
(5) whether the offenses have a common focus;
(6) whether the common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct;
(7) whether the elements that differ between the two offenses can be considered the same
under an imputed theory of liability that would result in the offenses being considered the
same under Blockburger and
(8) whether there is legislative history containing an articulation of an intent to treat the
offenses as the same or different for double jeopardy purposes.
These factors are not exclusive, and the question ultimately is whether the legislature intended
to allow the same conduct to be punished under both of the offenses.
Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 371.
The court remedies a double jeopardy violation by applying the "most serious offense" test. Id.
at 372-73; see also Landers v. State, 957 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (explaining the test
helps "eliminate[ the arbitrariness of relying [on how a statute is structured ... 'D. The court looks
first to see which conviction is the most serious. Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 372-73. This is determined by
examining the respective sentences as awarded by the jury and deciding whether they run concurrently
or not. See id. at 372-73 (emphasizing the need to evaluate more than just "the sentence imposed to
determine which of these offenses is the most serious"); see also Exparte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333,
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avoid concours apparent scenarios.2 58 In one instance, the ICTY appeals
chamber found that the inter-article2 59 convictions for willful killing-as a
grave breach of the Geneva Convention No. IV-was a legitimately
distinct offense from murder-as a violation of the laws and customs of
war.26 0  However, it also concluded that one offense subsumed the
other.2 6 1
Willful Killing Murder
(as a grave breach of the (as a violation of the laws
Geneva Conventions under and customs of war under ICTY
ICTY Statute Article 2) Statute Article 3)
a. death of the victim as the result a. death of the victim as a result of
of the action(s) of the accused, an act of the accused,
b. who intended to cause death or b. committed with the intention to
serious bodily injury which, as it cause death,
is reasonable to assume, he hadis rasonbleto asum, hehad C. and against a person taking noto understand was likely to lead and aint p sn ting no
to death, active part in the hostilities.
c. and which he committed against
a protected person.2 6 2
338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (extending discretion to the fact-finder and holding that "the 'most
serious' offense is the offense of conviction for which the greatest sentence was assessed"). Thus, a
third-degree felony conviction with a ten-year imprisonment sentence would be the "most serious"
offense compared to a second-degree felony with only a two-year sentence of imprisonment. See
Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 372-73 (evaluating the degrees of the offenses and the respective sentences in
determining which offense was the most serious). In the case of a tie, the court should then look to
the degrees of the offenses. Id. at 373. If they are also the same, the court should look at other
factors such as restitution. CavaZos, 203 S.W.3d at 338 (determining the "most serious" offense based
on the amount of fines or restitution attached to the conviction after finding the sentences'
imprisonment time and felony degrees were equal).
258. Celebi6i Case, supra note 165, I 412-13.
259. Under the ICTY Statute, the crime of "willful killings" is listed under Article 2. The
crime of "murders," however, is listed under Article 3. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Updated Statute for the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, art. 2, 5 (2009).
260. Celebii Case, supra note 165, I 414-23.
261. Id. 423.
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The eelebidi appeals chamber identified a "materially distinct element" in
the willful killing elements that was not present in the offense of
murder.2 64  Specifically, willful killing under Article 2 requires that the
victim classify as a "protected person."2 65  Since the classification of
"protected person" was more definitive than "a person taking no active
part in the hostilities," the offense required "proof of a fact not required
by the elements of murder."266 In reverse, however, the same could not
be said to be the case. "[T]he definition of murder under Article 3 does
not contain an element requiring proof of a fact not required by the
elements of willful killing under Article 2."1267 Since the Article 2 offense
of willful killing possessed the additional fact requirement, it was
determined to be the conviction with the more specific provision and
thereby upheld.268  The Article 3 conviction for murder, in turn, was
dismissed.26 9
As applied here, if President al-Assad were to be convicted of one of
the convictions listed below, the defense is likely to challenge that
subsequently charging the similar accompanying offense would be
inappropriate as it would create the possibility for an impermissible dual
conviction:
1. The crime against humanity of murder and the crime against
humanity of extermination;
2. The war crime of attacking civilians and the crime against
humanity of murder (or alternatively, extermination); and
3. The war crime of employing poison or poisoned weapons and




266. Id. T 421-23.
267. Id. ¶ 423.
268. See id. ("Because wil[1]ful killing under Article 2 contains an additional element and,
therefore, more specifically applies to the situation at hand, the Article 2 conviction must be upheld,
and the Article 3 conviction dismissed."); see also Kupreiki, Appeals Judgment, supra note 184, ¶ 387
(ruling a conviction should be made under the more specific provision).
269. Celebi6i Case, supra note 165, T 423. The tribunal used identical methods and reasoning
in adjudicating several "double convictions" including "wil[1]fully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health" under Article 2 and "cruel treatment" under Article 3; Article 2 torture and
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Utilizing the Blockburger test, the results are mixed. In the first category,
the intra-Article 7 charges for murder and extermination as crimes against
humanity cannot likely coexist as simultaneous convictions. Although the
extermination offense is materially distinct from the offense of murder, the
reverse is not true.2 7 0
Crime Against Humanity
of Murder
(Elements of Crinmes, art. 7(1)(a))
1. The perpetrator killed one or
more persons.
2. The conduct was committed as
part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian
population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the
conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.271
Crime Against Humanity
of Extermination
(Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(b))
1. The perpetrator killed one or
more persons, including by
inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a
population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took
place as part of, a mass killing of
members of a civilian population.
3. The conduct was committed as
part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian
population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the
conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.2 7 2
270. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(1)(a), (1)(b).
271. Id. art. 7(1)(a).
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Although the offense of extermination provides a more specific
alternative, the required facts for the first elements in both offenses are the
same. Dividing by the common denominator-the last two elements since
they are identical-leaves the offense of extermination with an additional
required fact that is not present in the offense of murder-the "mass
killing" conduct element.27 3  The offense of murder, on the other hand,
has no divergent elements remaining, leaving it subsumed by
extermination.2 Therefore, provided both charges end in conviction,
the ICC, under application of the Blockburger test, will most likely uphold
the offense of extermination and dismiss the offense of murder, assuming
they both rely on the same event facts.2 7 5
In the second category of challenged convictions, the defense will likely
challenge the war crime of attacking civilians as duplicative of its Article 7
counterparts with no success.276
273. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7(1)(a), (1)(b).
274. This assumes, of course, that he only facts utilized by the offense are mostly limited to
the events at Ghouta. Obviously, an actual prosecution might be able to maintain this conviction if
other events are incorporated as part of the support for conviction.
275. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding "the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not").
276. For our purposes here, we will assume that the crime against humanity counterpart is the
offense of extermination since it would be the likely survivor if simultaneously charged with the intra-
article offense of murder. Kupreiki6, Appeals Judgment, supra note 184, ¶ 387 (holding a conviction
should be made under the more specific provision).
[Vol. 49:165214
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War Crime of Attacking
Civilians
(Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2) (e) (i))
1. The perpetrator directed an
attack.
2. The object of the attack was a
civilian population as such or
individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the
civilian population as such or
individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities to be the
object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the
context of and was associated
with an armed conflict not of an
international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of
factual circumstances that




(Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(b))
1. The perpetrator killed one or
more persons, including by
inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a
population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took
place as part of, a mass killing of
members of a civilian population.
3. The conduct was committed as
part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian
population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the
conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.2 7 8
277. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xi).
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Dividing by the common denominators, in this case, leaves all of the
elements remaining. The first elements by themselves-both referencing
the actus reas of the offense-mutually require "proof of a fact not required
by the other.""' Therefore, the ICC will likely allow both convictions to
stand if challenged.2 so
In the final category of potential challenge, the likelihood of dismissal of
one of the charges is high. Without too liberal of an interpretation, it is
possible that the ICC may find that these two offenses are in fact the same
as applied here.2 81
279. Kupreiki6, Appeals Judgment, supra note 184, ¶ 387 (citing elebii Case, supra note 165,
TT 412-13).
280. Allowing both convictions to stand would be arguably consistent from a policy
standpoint as well as the current technical and legalistic view. As discussed earlier, the different focus
(or gravamen) of each offense across the intra-article divide is indicative of a very different legislative
intent in the creation of each. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 7 Intro., art. 8 Intro
(discussing the focus of the respective offenses assigned to each article); Exparte Benson, 459 S.W.3d
67, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (indicating the presumption of double jeopardy may be rebutted by a
clear "legislative intent to impose multiple punishments") (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366-68 (1983))).
281. But see Blockburger 284 U.S. at 304 ("A single act may be an offense against two statutes;
and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment
under the other.") (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (Mass. 1871))).
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War Crime of Employing War Crime of Employing
Poison or Poisonous Prohibited Gases, Liquids,
Weapons Materials or Devices
(Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii)) (Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(xiv))
1. The perpetrator employed a 1. The perpetrator employed a gas
substance or a weapon that or other analogous substance or
releases a substance as a result of device.
its employment. 2. The gas, substance or device was
2. The substance was such that it such that it causes death or
causes death or serious damage serious damage to health in the
to health in the ordinary course ordinary course of events,
of events, through its toxic through its asphyxiating or toxic
properties. properties.
3. The conduct took place in the 3. The conduct took place in the
context of and was associated context of and was associated
with an armed conflict not of an with an armed conflict not of an
international character. international character.
4. The perpetrator was aware of 4. The perpetrator was aware of
factual circumstances that factual circumstances that
established the existence of an established the existence of an
armed conflict.2 8 2  armed conflict.2 8 3
Removing the obvious common Article 8 denominators leaves the first
two elements of each offense remaining. Similarly, each offense's
respective second element, as qualifying circumstance elements to the
preceding conduct element, can also be removed. Neither "requires proof
of a fact not required by the other."2, 4 A comparison of the respective
conduct elements, however, can produce varying results. Since both allow
282. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii).
283. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiv).
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an alternative conduct, but do not require it,285 the alternative conduct
options can be ignored.2 8 This leaves the employment of a "substance"
versus the employment of a "gas." Since a "gas" is a narrower subcategory
of "substance," the provision requires "proof of a fact not required by the
other."2 " Hence, the ICC is likely to uphold a conviction based on the
War Crime of Employing Prohibited Gases, Liquids, Materials or Devices
and dismiss its concours apparent counterpart. 8
Therefore, the most likely surviving candidate charges for conviction
are: (1) the crime against humanity of extermination; (2) the war crime of
attacking civilians; and (3) the war crime of employing prohibited gases,
liquids, materials or devices.
VII. ATTACHING INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO
PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD
Assuming that at least some (if not all) of the above charges are
sufficient enough as offenses that were in fact committed, attaching
liability directly to President al-Assad as an individual might require an
extra step. A major factor to be considered is that President al-Assad is an
official head of state. From a defense perspective, this entitles him,
arguably, to some level of sovereign immunity. Additionally, if it cannot
285. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xiv) (referring to the
alternatives of "a weapon that releases a substance as a result of its employment" and "other
analogous substance or device").
286. This is especially so since the facts at hand are flexible enough to allow conviction on the
primary conduct stated by the elements. See id. (listing the elements of the war crimes associated with
the use of toxic substances); U.N. Mission Report - Ghouta, supra note 7, at 6-7 (discussing the
aftermath of the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta). However, it is worth noting that under the
alternative conduct options, one only requires a "substance" whereas the other requires the substance
be analogous to a gas. Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xiv). This implies a
greater specificity to the employment of a prohibited gas provision compared to the poisoned
weapon offense. In the likely event that one is said to subsume the other, this provides more
justification for upholding the conviction for employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or
devices. See id. art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xiv) (enumerating the requirements for the offenses of
employing toxic substances); (jelebici Case, supra note 165, TT 412-13 (upholding an Article 2
conviction because it applied more specifically to the situation than an Article 3 offense).
287. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiv) (specifying the substance of gas in
the first two elements); Celebici Case, supra note 165, TT 412-13 (emphasizing the need to choose
between two offenses when there is no materially distinct element).
288. See Elements ofCrimes, supra note 172, art. 8(2)(e)(xiii), (2)(e)(xiv) (outlining the offenses,
the latter of which contains a specific description of what a "substance" could be); delebi6i Case,
supra note 165, IN 413 (providing a method of deciding which offense should prevail).
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be proven that he directy ordered the attacks,8 the defense may present a
third-party perpetrator theory arguing that responsibility falls on the
shoulders of a scapegoat subordinate acting rogue. As it is not uncommon
for a culpable superior to deliberately obfuscate his connection to such a
massive crime, this provides the defense an additional obstacle to block a
successful prosecution and conviction to the ultimate authorities who
backed its commission.29 0  For the purposes of this paper, it will be safely
289. Under basic theories of criminal liability, a defendant is culpable for an offense if he or
she committed, planned, co-perpetrated, or ordered an offense to be carried out. See Cliff Farhang,
Point of No Return: Joint Criminal Enterprise in Brdanin, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 137, 140-42 (2010)
(assigning "liability for criminal conduct dispensed by a plurality pursuant to certain plan or
objective").
290. In Bkfdkii, for instance, General Tihomir Blaiki6 was charged with war crimes for the
derivative atrocities pursuant to Order D269. Blaiki6 Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶M 1-3.
At the trial level, Blaiki6 was found directly liable for ordering the crimes, and alternatively, liable
from a superior responsibility standpoint for war crimes committed at Ahmici, Santici, Pirici, and
Nadioci in 1993. Id. Under Order D269, HVO units subordinate to Blaikic were instructed to
"occupy the defense region, blockade villages and prevent all entrances to and exits from the
villages." Prosecutor v. Blaikit, Case No. IT-95-14-T, judgment, ¶ 435 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (citation omitted). "'[In the event of open attack activity by the
Muslims' those units should 'neutralize them and prevent their movements with precise fire" in
counterattack. Id. Furthermore, all units were to be tactically prepared to begin hostilities by
5:30 AM. Id. Prior orders, including the economic preservation of fuel and modes of combat, were
to be complied with. Id. ¶ 434.
The trial court interpreted Order D269 as the order to attack leading to ethnic cleansing of the
area as part of the creation of a "common Croatian state" by establishing a regional Croatian
majority. Id. ¶7 341, 469-89. The actual beginning of the combat corresponded to the time given
under Order D269. Id. With regard to the torching of residences and victims, "[i]t is hard to
imagin]e how the systematic use of petrol as a combat weapon could have been possible in that
period of fuel shortage without the approval of the military and/or civilian authorities." Id. ¶ 470.
As gathered from witness testimony, the execution of Muslim inhabitants appeared to have been in
accordance to orders: "[W]e all know that Blaikic has ordered that no prisoners of war were of
interest to him, only dead bodies." Id. ¶ 472 (citation omitted).
Under the alternative theory of criminal liability where Order D269 was not an attack order, the
trial chambers found culpability because (1) Blaikic knew that some of the troops-including military
police-were guilty of war crimes, and (2) the preventative order of January 18, 1993-ordering
soldiers known to be criminals to be taken out of positions where they could do criminal harm-
were unreasonable and ineffective. Id. 11 442-94.
However, the appeals chamber found the ruling "wholly erroneous" and reversed it. Blaikic
Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). Determining the order to be
"militarily justified" by the reasonable belief of imminent attack, the appeals chamber found no
evidence that the order was given with "clear intention that the massacre would be committed[,]" nor
any other link between the atrocities as a subordinate response to the Order D269. Id. ¶ 334 (citation
omitted). Additionally, there was insufficient awareness of a substantial likelihood that the atrocities
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assumed that direct liability will be hard-if not impossible-to
sufficiently prove, forcing the prosecution to find an alternate means.
Fortunately, there are several doctrines of liability under international
law that could be utilized to overcome any such obstacles. If direct
liability is somehow barred,"'1 President al-Assad's culpability may still be
provable under the doctrine of superior responsibility or through indirect.
co-perpetration.2 9 2 However, as a head of state, it is likely that the
doctrine of superior responsibility will be preferred by the prosecution.2 9 3
Under this theory, culpability can attach if President al-Assad had:
(1) actual or sufficient constructive knowledge that subordinates were
committing offenses, and (2) President al-Assad failed to take any
necessary or reasonable measures to prevent such offenses or to punish
would happen as proof beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal culpability purposes. Id. ¶ 444.
Consequently, Blaikic was sentenced to only nine years of imprisonment for lesser charges which
included the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Id. ch. XIII.
291. Under general criminal principles of liability, if direct liability cannot be proven,
culpability may typically still be found if the accused: instigated, incited, solicited, attempted, aided
and abetted, was complicit or conspired with the direct perpetrators during the life of the crime,
served as an accessory before-the-fact, served as an accessory after-the-fact, or otherwise knowingly
facilitated the commission of the crime. Ian Leader-Elliot, Benthamite Relecions on Codzication of the
General Princples of Criminal Liabity: Towards the Panopticon, 9 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2006).
However, in the realm of international law, as numerous countries follow sometimes diverging legal
philosophies regarding criminal liability, finding a clear-cut road to establishing criminal culpability
can be a challenge. See id. at 410 (discussing distinctions between other countries' criminal liability
requirements).
292. See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Art. 61(7)(a) and (b) of Rome Statute, ¶ 297 (jan. 23, 2012) (utilizing "indirect
co-perpetration" to indict Omar Al Bashir for crimes against humanity in Sudan). Indirect Co-
Perpetration requires the following:
(i) the suspect must be part of a common plan or an agreement with one or more persons;
(ii) the suspect and the other coperpetrator(s) must carry out essential contributions in a
coordinated manner which result in the fulfillment of the material elements of the crime; (iii) the
suspect must have control over the organization; (iv) the organization must consist of an
organized and hierarchal apparatus of power; (v) the execution of the crimes must be secured by
almost automatic compliance with the orders issued by the suspect; (vi) the suspect must satisfy
the subjective elements of the crimes; (vii) the suspect and the other co-perpetrators must be
mutually aware and accept that implementing the common plan will result in the fulfillment of
the material elements of the crimes; and (viii) the suspect must be aware of the factual
circumstances enabling him to exercise joint control over the commission of the crime through
another person(s).
Id.
293. The doctrine of superior responsibility is expressly provided for in the Rome Statute
under Article 28, whereas indirect co-perpetration-though well established in its own right-is only
statutorily implied and otherwise a creature of case law. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28.
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the offending subordinates upon discovery.29 These elements can be
separated out into several key components: (1) the mens rea component-
294. Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute titled "Responsibility of Commanders and Other
Superiors":
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly
over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit
such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(il) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and
control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28. Protocol I also discusses superior responsibility:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate
does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if
they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Protocol I, supra note 193, art. 86. Protocol I goes on to discuss duties on high commanders with
certain knowledge of crimes that may be committed by subordinates:
The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander who is
aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have
committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are
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al-Assad sufficiently "had reason to know" of the offenses beforehand or
after the fact; (2) the subordination component-those committing the
offenses were in a superior-subordinate relationship with al-Assad; and
(3) the failure of an existing legal obligation component-al-Assad
unreasonably failed to fulfill a duty to either prevent the offense or punish
those responsible after-the-fact.29 5  Since al-Assad's relationship with
those who brought about the commission of the offense itself can affect
the other component standards, the subordination component will be
addressed first.
A. The Superior-Subordinate Component: President al-Assad had a Superior-
Subordinate Relationshio as an 'Effective Military Commander"
Although the history of the doctrine of superior responsibility is still
very loosely applied between the two types of superiors, Article 28 of the
Rome Statute seems to establish some distinction between "military
commander[s]" and "civilian" superiors.29 ' However, regardless of which
categories President al-Assad falls under, establishing culpability under a
superior responsibility theory absolutely requires that a superior-
subordinate relationship is established.29 In other words, "a position of
command is indeed a necessary precondition for the imposition of command
responsibility." 9 8
This relationship can exist regardless of whether the superior qualifies as
a de jure commander-formally accorded command authority by legally
recognized entitlement-or as a de facto commander-informally and
effectively possessing command authority under the circumstances.29
necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or to this Protocol, and, where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.
Id. art. 87.
295. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28 (detailing when a "military commander" or
other superior "effectively acting as a military commander" can be found liable for offenses
committed by a subordinate).
296. Compare id. art. 28(a) (referring to "a military commander"), nith id. art. 28(b) (referring to
"superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a)").
297. See Celebii Case, supra note 165, ¶ 196 ("'Command,' a term which does not seem to
present particular controversy in interpretation, normally means powers that attach to a military
superior, whilst the term 'control', which has a wider meaning, may encompass powers wielded by
civilian leaders.").
298. Id.¶188.
299. See id. TT 192-99 (discussing the requirements of superior-subordinate relationships
under both de jure and de facto commander situations).
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Although the possession of a de jure command position may serve as
significant indicia towards criminal liability as a superior, it is not
necessarily dispositive.o3 0  Requiring otherwise would convert the superior
responsibility standard into one of strict liability.3 o1 Instead, the
dispositive factor is the possession by the commander of the "material
ability" to "effectively control" subordinates to "prevent and punish the
commission" of crimes.3 0 2  "The doctrine of command responsibility is
ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to control acts of his
subordinates."0 3  "Effective control," however, is more than a mere
"substantial influence," but rather an "effective power to control the
subordinate, in the sense of preventing or punishing criminal conduct."3 0 4
Although de jure command positions are not dispositive, "[t]his is why a
subordinate unit of the superior or commander is a sine qua non for
superior responsibility"-even when dealing with informal or unofficial
hierarchal structures.3 0 s Utilizing this dispositive factor, the possession of
effective control over subordinates can extend the scope of the definition
of "military commander" to include even civilian leaders.3 0 6
In the context of President al-Assad, the prosecution will more than
likely be able to show effective control over the offending subordinate
300. Id. ¶¶ 188-99 ("Accordingly, formal designation as a commander should not be
considered to be a necessary prerequisite for command responsibility to attach, as such responsibility
may be imposed by virtue of a person's defacto, as well as dejure position as a commander.") (citing
the trial chamber).
301. See id. TT 198, 198 n.259 (finding "reliance on de facto control to establish superior
responsibility does not amount to a form of strict liability").
302. Id. ¶ 197. "In determining questions of responsibility it is necessary to look to effective
exercise of power or control and not to formal titles." Id.
303. See id. (quoting the trial chambers).
304. Id. 254.
305. Id. (quoting the trial chambers); see id. ("Mt [is] apparent that [hierarchy and chains of
command] need not be established in the sense of formal organisational structures so long as the
fundamental requirement of an effective power to control the subordinate, in the sense of preventing
or punishing criminal conduct, is satisfied.").
306. The judgment in Delaic stated:
[qivilian leaders may incur responsibility in relation to acts committed by their subordinates or
other persons under their effective control. Effective control has been accepted, including in
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, as a standard for the purposes of determining superior





Cho: Chemical Weapon Attacks in Ghouta
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
ST. MARY'S LAJ FOURNAL
forces under both a de jure relationship as well as a de facto one. As the
legal head of state, President al-Assad is the de jure commander-in-chief of
the regime's military with the legal prima facie authority to issue orders to
both preventively control and punish those forces under his command.
This offers a significant, though non-dispositive, showing of his command
authority over the actual actors involved. Furthermore, from the effective
control standpoint, given al-Assad's undisputed life-long hold over his
dictatorial position-achieved through political and military force-it is
easily inferred that any rogue elements operating outside of his established
parameters or otherwise in disobedience of presidential directives would
suffer punishment. In dictatorial fashion, therefore, President al-Assad,
though he may allege himself a civilian, should qualify as a military
commander for the purposes of the events at Ghouta.
B. The Mens Rea Component: President al-Assad had More than Sufficient
"Reason to Know"
Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the mens rea component has two
differing standards separating "military commander[s]" and "civilian"
superiors."o Essentially, following a heightened negligence standardo
3 0
for military commanders, it must be shown that the commander
objectively "either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known" of the commission of the offenses.30" Alternatively, for a
307. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28(a) (outlining the elements for when to hold
"a military commander ... criminally responsible"), with id. art. 28(b) (enumerating the instances
where a "superior shall be criminally responsible").
308. The Model Penal Code defines criminal negligence as:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
309. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28(a)(i). Although it would be only persuasive
authority to the ICC, the United States' Army Field Manual, developed in line with international law,
similarly states:
In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons subject to their control.... Such a
responsibility arises directly when the acts in question have been comntitted in pursuance of an
order of the commander concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual
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civilian (or de facto) superior, the Rome Statute requires that the "superior
either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated" the subordinate commission of offenses to have sufficient mens
rea culpability.3 1 o The language leans heavily in favor of a narrower
recklessness standard than required for military commanders.3 1 1
However, although one standard appears heightened compared to the
other, neither standard necessitates actual knowledge.3 12  Even though
there is no "automatic" duty to obtain information of subordinate offenses
knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by him or through other
means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure
compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof.
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE T 501 (1956).
310. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28(b).
311. Regarding criminal recklessness, the Model Penal Code states:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
312. See Blaikic Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, IT 304-40 (interpreting the
knowledge requirement for criminal responsibility as satisfied in the absence of actual knowledge if
the superior should have known about the future commission of crimes). In Blalki6, the appeals
chamber, although reversing the finding on this point, agreed with the trial chamber, in theory, that
"knowledge may be proved either through direct or circumstantial evidence." Id. ¶ 304. The court in
Blalkil, went on to state:
With regard to circumstantial evidence,. . . determining whether in fact a superior must have
had the requisite knowledge it may consider inter alia the following indicia ... :
* the number, type and scope of the illegal acts;
* the time during which the illegal acts occurred;
* the number and type of troops involved;
* the logistics involved, if any;
* the geographical location of the acts;
* the widespread occurrence of the acts;
* the speed of the operations;
* the modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
* the officers and staff involved;
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attached to a superior's position, "responsibility can be imposed for
deliberately refraining from finding out."' Failure to establish a
sufficient "reason to know" by the prosecution would give rise to the
defense of impossible performance.3 14  Nevertheless, whether the
superior "had reason to know" may be proven if the accused "had
information which put him on notice that crimes had been committed by his
subordinates.. ."`s Such information, under the "had reason to know"
standard, would have to be of a nature that gives rise to a "reason to
believe that crimes had been committed in light of the military conflict
taking place at that time ... ."3'6
The prosecutor, here, should be able to establish the mens rea
component under either standard. However, since satisfying the seemingly
stricter standard for civilian superiors necessarily satisfies the military
commander standard, the seemingly stricter standard will be assumed to be
the requisite one."' Regarding the attacks at Ghouta, there is publicized
313. Id.T406.
314. In (elebid, the trial chamber interpreted the "had reason to know" component, under the
ICTY Statute, to not require a pure objectively reasonable person standard under the Doctrine of
Superior Responsibility:
It must, however, be recognised that international law cannot oblige a superior to perform the
impossible. Hence, a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such
measures that are within his powers. The question then arises of what actions are to be
considered to be within the superior's powers in this sense. As the corollary to the standard
adopted by the Trial Chamber with respect to the concept of superior, we conclude that a
superior should be held responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his material
possibility.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 395 (Int'l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 1998).
315. Blaikic Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶ 407.
316. Id.T408.
317. Examining the mens rea component under the stricter standard is also advantageous
because of the potentially ambiguous requirements under the Superior Responsibility Doctrine. See
Blaiki6 Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶¶ 57, 63 (denying Blaiki6's proposed theory that
actual knowledge should be required for culpability and instead affirming the eelebidi interpretation of
"had reason to know" as definitive in finding the requisite "knowledge" component through a non-
exhaustive list of indicia for the court to consider).
Under Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, Articles 86 and 87 make a reverse distinction-as
prima facially compared to the Rome Statute-between a superior and a commander. Under
Article 86, a superior's mens rea requirement can be satisfied "if they knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time" that a subordinate was either
engaging or about to engage in an offence. Protocol I, supra note 193, art. 86. Stricter language is
used for a commander, requiring "any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons
under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach" of the Protocol, exercise
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evidence establishing the existence of a formal authorization procedure of
the Syrian regime in order to permissibly utilize chemical weapons.3 1 1
This would entail necessarily either President al-Assad's direct
authorization or such permission through his preapproved delegated
authority. Furthermore, corroborating intelligence findings stated that not
only was the attack part of a larger strategic push to "rid the Damascus
suburbs of opposition forces," a senior official communicated the directive
to responsible regime forces to cease operations and hide any evidence.3 "
Even from a broader governmental policy standpoint, the integration of
chemical weapons within the "classical tactical pattern" of bombardment
followed by a ground offensive is reportedly "consistent, on a military
level, with the Syrian armed forces' doctrine."3 2 0 Even in the event that a
rogue element utilized chemical weapons at Ghouta without the regime's
permission, given the international community's incredulous media frenzy
both in regards to alleged instances predating Ghouta"' as well as in
"necessary control" to prevent or punish. Id. art. 87. Since the use of chemical weapons also
breaches Protocol I in regard to proportionality of acceptable military attacks (in addition to the
simultaneous violation of the larger Geneva Conventions for use of prohibited weapons in light of its
mass destruction), it is most probably a sound yet conservative legal strategy to apply the seemingly
stricter standard since it can still meet with success.
318. "Permission to authorise [chemical weapons] has probably been delegated by President
As[s]ad to senior regime commanders, such as [*], but any deliberate change in the scale and nature
of use would require his authorisation." JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMM., supra note 68, at 3. "[*]"
denotes redaction of certain senior commanders in the Syrian regime. Reports indicated al-Assad
was intimately involved with the development of chemical weapons in Syria:
[T]he Syrian military responsible for filling munitions with chemical agents and for security at
storage sites-'Branch 450' of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (CERS)-was
staffed only by members of the president's Alawite sect and was 'distinguished by a high level of
loyalty to the regime.' Bashar al-Assad and certain members of his inner circle were the only
ones permitted to give the order for the use of chemical weapons ....
Syria ChemicalAttack What We Know, supra note 3.
319. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 68; see also JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMM., supra
note 68 (concurring the attacks "were conducted to help clear the Opposition from strategic parts of
Damascus").
320. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, supra note 14. As discussed earlier, the Syrian regime adopted a
military strategy of chemical weapon warfare by (1) stockpiling equipment and delivering systems
capable of chemical agent munitions; (2) pursuing a research and development program for
producing multiple types of chemical weapons; and (3) assembling and maintaining one of the largest
known chemical weapon stockpiles in the international community.
321. As an example of one of several instances predating the Ghouta attacks, chemical
weapons were used allegedly at Khan al-Assal on March 19, 2013, which resulted in the beginning
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reaction to Ghouta, President al-Assad was on clear notice of the abuses
of such subordinates to do something about it. Consequently, al-Assad's
only credible counter to the finding of the requisite mens rea would be to
show that he made sufficient efforts to punish the involved subordinates
both as a punitive measure and a deterrence from future insubordination.
Given that there is no public information along these lines, it is unlikely
that President al-Assad, in fact, did so.
C. The Legal Obligation Component: al-Assad Failed to Fulfll His Duty to Take
'A/l Necessary and Reasonable Measures" to Prevent or Punish Subordinates for
the Offenses
As the last component, the prosecution must demonstrate that in spite
of al-Assad's "effective control" over his subordinates, and in light of his
actual or constructive knowledge, he still failed to exercise such control as
necessary and as reasonably to either "prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution."322 "Necessary and reasonable measures," however,
maintain parameters difficult to delineate.3 2 3  In broad and self-defining
terms, the standard requires that an individual within a superior position
take allnecessary and reasonable measures "that are within [the superior's]
material possibility . .. " As an affirmative duty, a failure to complete
all such measures, in combination with the other components, results in
criminal liability.3 25 Although the principle was interpreted harshly against
of a U.N. investigation. Wm. Robert Johnston, Summary ofHistoricalAttacks Using Chemical or Biological
Weapons, JOHNSTONS ARCHIVE (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/
chembioattacks.html [https://perma.cc/CR2E-8NMZ].
322. Under the Rome Statute, Articles 28(a)(ii) and (b)(iii) utilize identical language with
regard to the legal obligation for both military commanders and superiors. Rome Statute, supra
note 106, art. 28(a)-(b).
323. Id.
324. Blaikid Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194, ¶ 417 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1395 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
325. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, T 395 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing a superior's criminal responsibility for failing to take
measures within his power to prevent his subordinates' crimes); Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-
95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 443 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
Kordi6, Trial Judgment] (stating "it is the actual ability or effective capacity to take measures which is
important" in determining if the superior took all necessary and reasonable measures). The Kordil
court referenced duty of commanders under Protocol I:
The duty that rests on military commanders properly to supervise their subordinates is for
instance expressed in Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, entitled 'Duty of commanders', which
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defendants in its infancy,12 1 the flexible standard of what is required to
fulfill any such duty has since been seemingly relaxed in more modern
tribunals.327
As mentioned above, if a harsher interpretation by the ICC is taken, it
could give potential rise to an impossibility of performance defense.32
However, under such a legal defense, the accused could face the scenario
where they must choose which prong to legally admit to and which prong
to attack. For instance, in the event that a superior lost "effective control"
for the time relevant to their subordinate's offenses, the superior would
have to show that they had no "material ability'' to issue orders that would
be obeyed-excusing them from taking any preventative or punitive
measures.3 2 ' Alternatively, the accused could choose to legally admit to
imposes an affirmative duty on them to prevent persons under their control from committing
violations of international humanitarian law, and to punish the perpetrators if violations occur.
Id. ¶ 369 (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 334 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
326. During the post-WWII Tokyo Tribunals, Koki Hirota, then-Foreign Minister for
Imperial Japan, was tried and executed for his failure to pursue more insistent complaints to the
Imperial Cabinet to take adequate steps to stop the Rape of Nanking. International Military Tribunal
for the Far East Majority Judgment, Hirota, Koki, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: CHARGER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS, 603-04
(Robert Cryer & Neil Boister eds., 2008). Although Koki Hirota had no direct nor other actual
authority over the military, as a high ranking civilian minister in the government, the tribunal found
that he was more than aware of the atrocities in Nanking due to the receipt of regular reports. Id.
Furthermore, although he sent an initial complaint to higher authorities, Hirota accepted
"assurances" that steps would be taken in spite of his awareness that they were not. Id. The tribunal,
in addition to other charges, found him guilty in being derelict of his duty for failing to make
additional and more insistent efforts to complete the requisite "necessary and reasonable measures"
of his legal obligation. Id. Hirota was consequently executed by hanging. Id. at 627.
327. See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, In 183, 184, 230
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda June 7, 2001) (acquitting the accused of superior responsibility liability
due to a lack of sufficient command authority in the de jure superior-subordinate relationship and
consequently finding no failure to take sufficient measures to prevent or punish, especially in light of
a lack of resources).
328. Blaikid Case, Appeal Judgment, supra note 194 ¶ 417.
329. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, IM 394-95 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). In the highly controversial trial of World War II, General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was charged with Japanese atrocities committed in the Philippines, raised
the defense that he had no effective control over troops due to a lack of effective communication
with regard to some troops and a lack of formal authority over certain naval troops. UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRnvIES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1-2, 18 (1948).
Though generating much controversy, the attempted defense was ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 35.
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"effective control," but face the possible allegation that the orders given
were insufficient to fulfill all "necessary and reasonable measures."3 3 o
In the instant case, there is a lack of sufficient information to accurately
predict President al-Assad's defense on this issue. Assuming there was a
rogue action within his regime, he may have taken some after-the-fact
measures to prevent future occurrences. However, given the nature of his
dictatorial presidency and the stakes of the Syrian conflict, it might have
been a politically unacceptable loss of face for al-Assad to admit to even a
momentary lack of control. This may have forced him to keep the public
visibility of after-the-fact punishment to a minimum, thereby reducing its
deterrence effect on future insubordinate troops."' In addition to
admitting the possession of effective control, al-Assad runs the risk that
the bias of the world community (and inevitably of the ICC judges) will
interpret this as failing to fulfill the mandatory legal obligation. On the
other hand, refuting the existence of effective control runs the risk of the
court finding the opposite and, resultantly, a breach of his legal duties.
President al-Assad, though not initially authorizing the rogue act, runs the
risk of having effectively adopted the offense as his own through
acquiescence.3 3 2
Nevertheless, from what is currently known, al-Assad, while maintaining
at least the appearance of being in control, has not taken any publically
visible steps to fulfill his mandatory obligation. In fact, what is known
shows the complete opposite. President al-Assad has not only failed to
punish and deter future chemical weapons use, chemical weapons use in
Syria has aggressively continued in flagrant defiance of the newly joined
Chemical Weapons Convention.3 3 3  In at least one reported instance in
330. See (Celebi6i Case, supra note 165, T 196 (concluding "leaders may incur responsibility in
relation to acts committed by their subordinates or other persons under their effective control");
Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 28(b)(iii) (finding a superior liable when: "[t]he superior failed to
take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution").
331. See Kordil, Trial Judgment, supra note 234, ¶ 371 (discussing situations where the
"omissions of an accused in a position of superior authority [might] contribute to the commission of
a crime" by, for instance, encouraging the perpetrator).
332. Failure of a commander to take the requisite measures to prevent or punish a
subordinate could result in a legal "acquiescence" of the crime itself. See id. ¶ 389 (articulating the
potential for a superior to be held criminally liable through acquiescence by aiding, abetting,
encouraging, or failing to intervene in the commission of a crime).
333. A year following Ghouta and Syria's agreement to surrender its chemical weapons, four
previously undisclosed Syrian chemical weapons laboratories were discovered. Syia Discloses Four
Secret Chemical Weapons Facilities, UN Says, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
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2014, a chlorine gas bomb was found to have been deployed by a Syrian
regime helicopter. The international community has additionally
submitted evidence to the OPCW of numerous other allegations of
chemical weapons use between December 2015 and August 20160
These additional post-Ghouta episodes include: thirteen incidents involving
the use of sarin, four incidents involving the use of VX, forty-one
incidents involving the use of chlorine and sixty-one incidents involving
the use of an unspecified chemical agent as a weapon."' The Syrian
regime's continued and apparent course of performance,3 3 7 as the ICC
would likely find, would be highly persuasive-if not outright
dispositive-of al-Assad's superior liability (if not direct liability) for the
Ghouta attacks.
com/world/2014/oct/07/syria-secret-chemical-weapons-facilities-un-says [https://perma.cc/ML5X
-NLzq. Three of the facilities were for research while the fourth was tasked with chemical weapon
production. Id Additionally, the UN and OPCW-in a joint investigative mission-conclusively
found the use of "systematicn and repeatedf]" use of chlorine-another prohibited chemical
weapons agent-in northern Syria. Id; see also Colum Lynch & David Kenner, U.S. and Europe Say
Assad May Have Kept Some Chemical Weapons, FOREIGN PUB. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/23/u-s-and-europe-say-assad-may-have-kept-some-chemical-weapons/
[https://perma.cc/34U-F938] (reporting Syria's steady increase in chemical weapons capability since
joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and surrendering its stockpile post Ghouta). In at least
one of these chlorine attacks, the UN-OPCW investigative team found "sufficient information for
the Panel to conclude that the [chlorine gas attack at Talmenes] was caused by a Syrian Arab Armed
Forces helicopter dropping a device causing damage to the structure of a concrete block building and
was followed by the release of a toxic substance that affected the population." Third Report of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative
Mechanism, in letter dated Aug. 24, 2016 from the Leadership Panel of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2016/738 (Aug. 24, 2016).
334. Id. at 18.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Under contract law principles, the course of dealing or course of performance by parties
to an agreement can be indicative of an existing mutually understood-and-agreed term although it
may not be explicitly mentioned or recorded. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1977) (discussing the use of course of performance in ascertaining the meaning of the
parties' agreement); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 61 ("In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person
would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including
the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any
subsequent conduct of the parties.").
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D. The Head of State Immunity Problem
Although the normal hurdles for attaching direct or superior liability are
likely to be overcome, President al-Assad's position could offer a
significant challenge. As a head of state, al-Assad will likely claim to be
protected by sovereign immunity. 3 As the head of state, al-Assad's
decisions and other conduct are arguably the acts of the Syrian state itself
thereby making him immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.3 39
While customary international law may be unclear on whether head of
state immunity may be overcome,340  there is substantial support for
overcoming any such immunity.
One major instance under customary international law includes the
indictment of President Slobodan Milogevi6 of the Federal Republic of
338. "According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot,
without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign." Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U.S 677, 690 (2004) (citing Brief for Petitioners, App. A, at Ia). The Supreme Court
provided a brief discussion on the origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp.:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England, where it was thought that the King
could not be sued. However, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally
distinguished between the King and his agents, on the theory that the King would never
authorize unlawful conduct, and that therefore the unlawful acts of the King's officers ought
not to be treated as acts of the sovereign.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 142 (1984) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 244 (George Sharswood, 1909)). The
problem presented here is when the head of state himself is the one in violation of legal obligations.
339. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 142 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 244 (George Sharswood, 1909)).
340. See Applicant's Motion Made Under Protest and Without Waiving of Immunity at 1-7,
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I-015 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone July 23, 2003) (arguing that
under customary international law, the head of state-"derivative of the principle of State
Immunity"-is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution); see also David Swanson, Prsecution of
George W Bush by the International Criminal Court: An Open Letter to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief






perma.cc/S6WU-2NTH] (criticizing the inconsistent application of the ICC in its pursuit of
prosecution over the president of Sudan and refusal to pursue any investigation of Former President
George W. Bush and Former Vice President Dick Cheney). One counter-argument to this
comparison is that the United States criminal justice system does not qualify as "unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out [an] investigation or prosecution." Jesse Oppenheim, Despite Caims, ICC
Prosecution of Bush, Bhir Would Be Illegal, JURIST-DATELINE (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.
jurist.org/dateline/2012/09/jesse-oppenheim-desmond-tutu.php [http://perma.cc/83HF-RCHL
(citing Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 17).
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Yugoslavia for war crimes and crimes against humanity.34 1 This was the
first case of prosecuting a head of state by the ICTY.3 4 2 On the question
of whether the ICTY could maintain jurisdiction over such a head of state,
the Prosecutor publically justified the tribunal's authority under the initial
UN resolution-creating the tribunal-and subsequent affirmations by
UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199.343
The jurisdiction of this Tribunal is not conditional upon President
Milosevic's consent, nor is it dependent on the outcome of any negotiations
between him and anyone else. It is for the Judges of this Tribunal to
interpret such jurisdiction and for the Security Council to modify or
expand.3 4 4
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) justified the inclusion of
Former President Charles Ghankay Taylor of Liberia to be within the
court's jurisdiction on similar grounds: "[T]he principle seems now
established that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of
State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or
court."3
45
In the case of the ICC, as an international criminal tribunal,
jurisdictional authority is continued in the Rome Statute, which declares
"official capacity as a Head of State or Govern ent ... shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility. .. "' However, it is
341. In addition to Slobodan Miloievid, warrants of arrest for heads of state were also issued
for Milan Milutinovii, the President of Serbia, and Nikola Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Press Release, U.N., Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia,
President Milosevic and Four Other Senior FRY Officials Indicted for Murder, Persecution and
Deportation in Kosovo (May 27, 1999), http://www.icty.org/en/sid/7765 [https://perma.cc/
MMG6-HPQ7].
342. Id.
343. Press Release, U.N., Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor Seeks
Assurance from President Milosevic Regarding Kosovo Investigations (Oct. 15, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/en/sid/7629 [https://perma.cc/C3S3-FYCR].
344. Id.
345. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, T 52
(Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004).
346. Rome Statute, supra note 103, art. 27. In spite of their jurisdictional authority, there has
still been some resistance by even States that have formally recognized the authority of these
tribunals. For instance, Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-where Milogevi6 took
sanctuary-were resistant to complying with the ICTY's 1998 warrant until 2001. Press Release,
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more realistic to anticipate numerous political obstacles in spite of the
international community's legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC.34 7
In a purely theoretical application, however, there is more than sufficient
authority for the Prosecution to force the majority of the international
community to cooperate in gaining custody of President al-Assad.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Following World War I and World War II, the collective world horror
at the atrocities and systematic magnitude gave birth to the United
Nations, the organization created as a worldwide measure for the
"prevention and removal of threats to the peace" as well as the promotion
of a "respect for human rights."" Sadly, the U.N. has fallen short on
many occasions in accomplishing its mission.34 9  These shortcomings
have included the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the international
U.N., Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor Seeks Assurance from President
Milosevic Regarding Kosovo Investigations (Oct. 15, 1998), http://www.icty.org/en/sid/7629
[https://perma.cc/C3S3-FYCR]. The ICC is experiencing a similar resistance to trying its first
indicted head of state. Omar Al Bashir, the former President of the Sudan, has thus far eluded the
ICC despite two warrants for his arrest. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05/01/09, Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (July 12,
2010). At least one member of the international community has reportedly failed to cooperate with
the ICC in executing Bashir's arrest. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05/01/09, Decision Requesting Observations About Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to Malawi,
at 4 (Oct. 19, 2011) (warning Malawi that further non-cooperation in arresting Bashir, as obligated
under the Rome Statute, would be reported to the U.N.).
347. As Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni observes:
Bartering away justice for political results, albeit in the pursuit of peace is the goal of most
political leaders who seek to end conflicts or facilitate transitions to non-tyrannical regimes.
The grim reality is that in order to obtain peace, negotiations must be held with the very leaders
who frequently are the ones who committed, ordered, or allowed terrible crimes to be
committed. Thus, the choice presented to negotiators is whether to have peace or justice.
Sometimes this dichotomy is presented along more sophisticated lines: peace now, and justice
some other time.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving justice. The Need for Accountabiiy, 59 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni - SearchingforPeace].
348. U.N. Charter, art. 1, IM 1, 3.
349. See Bassiouni - Searching for Peace, supra note 348, at 9, 10 (comparing the 20th Century
death tolls of an estimated 170 million from non-international conflicts to an estimated 33 million
military casualties); see also Jeremy Blackman, Getting to No' Why Russia Loves the Veto, PBS (Sept. 26,
2012 11:10 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/un-security-council-getting-to-no-why-
russia-loves-the-veto/ [https://perma.cc/TL77-2FMH] (reporting Russia has overwhelmingly cast
the most veto votes in the sixty-seven years of U.N. history, often in coordination with China, as a
means of preventing Western activism as perceived by Russia and China).
234 [Vol. 49:165
70
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 1, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/2
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
failure to prevent genocide on more than one occasion.3 so However, by
that same token, the U.N. and other international efforts have succeeded
in keeping the world from the brink of destruction in the age of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Despite its sometimes
huge hiccups, the U.N. and the international community have progressed
the principles of international rule of law and an increasing international
respect for it by its members, albeit in spurts.3 s1
Though much has been done, more is needed. In addition to curbing
worldwide the serious ongoing violations of human rights, the events at
Ghouta offer a chance to set a landmark precedent in the prohibition of
employing chemical weapons. Although a prohibition on modern
chemical weapons use has existed for more than a century, it is ironic that
it has been hard to enforce or even internationally codify35 2 in spite of a
modern history replete with violations.3 s3 Here, the International
Criminal Court has the chance to stand against curbing human rights
violations, as well as prohibited means of warfare, by charging President al-
Assad with the following: (1) the crime against humanity of extermination;
(2) the war crime of attacking civilians; and (3) the war crime of employing
prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices. The ICC's adjudication of
the violations at Ghouta, however, offers the chance to not only deter
future rogue state leaders from engaging in irresponsible behavior, but also
to show, as a matter of precedent, that individual liability can still apply
despite the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to a head of state.3 5 4
350. See, e.g., About the ICTY, supra note 153 (discussing the acts of genocide and war crimes
that took place during the 1990s in the Balkans).
351. Id
352. See SCHABAS, supra note 241, at 280-81 (discussing the international disagreement on
how to codify customary international rules on prohibited methods of warfare in drafting the Rome
Statute).
353. See Bassiouni - Searching for Peace, swpra note 348, at 10-11 (outlining the numerous crimes
committed across internal armed conflicts since World War II and remarking on the very small
number of prosecution of those crimes); Williams Robert Johnston, Summag of Historical Attacks
Using Chemicalor Biological Weapons, JOHNSTON ARCHIVES (Nov. 30, 2016), http://wwxv.johnstons
archive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html [https://perma.cc/CR2E-8NMZ] (listing numerous
attacks utilizing chemical agents, many of which were never criminally prosecuted). But see, 1 U.N.
WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS: THE ZYKLON B CASE 93-
94 (1947) (finding German industrialists guilty of war crimes for supplying Zyklon B, a deadly poison
gas, for use at Auschwitz/Birkenau and other concentration camps).
354. Bassiouni - Searching for Peace, supra note 348, at 12-13.
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As Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni eloquently states: "[n a world order based
on the rule of law and not on the rule of might, the attainment of peace to
end conflicts cannot be totally severed from the pursuit of justice
whenever that may be required in the aftermath of violence."3 5 5 Finally
and along parallel reasoning, although the tu quoque argument has been
declared legally void, maybe through prosecuting al-Assad, those
remaining disbelieving nation-states and non-state actors will become
convinced that it is actually true.
355. Id at 13.
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